University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2017

Constructing an International Community
Monica Hakimi
University of Michigan Law School, mhakimi@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1865

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the International Law Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons
Recommended Citation
Hakimi, Monica. "Constructing an International Community." Am. J. Int'l L. 111, no. 2 (2017): 317-56.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

Copyright © 2017 by The American Society of International Law
doi:10.1017/ajil.2017.22

CONSTRUCTING AN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
By Monica Hakimi*
ABSTRACT
What unites states and other global actors around a shared governance project? How does the group—
what I will call an “international community”—coalesce and stay engaged in the enterprise? A frequent
assumption is that an international community is cemented by its members’ commonalities and depleted
by their intractable disagreements. This article critiques that assumption and presents, as an alternative,
a theory that accounts for the combined integration and discord that actually characterize most global governance associations. I argue that conﬂict, especially conﬂict that manifests in law, is not necessarily corrosive
to an international community. To the contrary, it often is a unifying force that helps constitute and fortify
the community and support the governance project. As such, international legal conﬂict can have systemic
value for the global order, even when it lacks substantive resolution. The implications for the design and
practice of international law are far-reaching.

I. INTRODUCTION
What unites states and other global actors around a governance project? How does the
group—what I will call an “international community”—coalesce and stay engaged in the
joint enterprise?1 A frequent assumption is that an international community is cemented
by its members’ commonalities and depleted by their intractable disagreements. I argue in
this article that that assumption is incorrect. And I present, as an alternative, a theory that
accounts for the combined integration and discord that actually characterize most global

* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. For comments on earlier drafts, I am grateful to Don
Herzog, Richard Primus, Steven Ratner, the anonymous peer reviewers for this journal, and the participants in the
December 2016 Faculty Workshop at Bar-Ilan Law School and the February 2017 Workshop on International
and Comparative Law at the University of Minnesota Law School. Katherine Bailey and Avery Johnson provided
excellent research support.
1
The phrase “international community” is often used casually, as rhetorical shorthand for the set of actors who
mingle across national borders. See Dino Kritsiotis, Imagining the International Community, 13 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 961, 964 (2002) (describing the use of the phrase as a “rhetorical device” or “convenient descriptive harness”
for “the expanding set of ‘persons’ identiﬁed in orthodox accounts of the subjects of international law”). Beyond
that usage, the phrase is abstract and lacks much accepted content. See STEVEN R. RATNER, THE THIN JUSTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 59–60 (2015) (“For the most part, international lawyers assume the existence of an international community of states . . .” or have “at best a meager understanding [of it.]”); Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding
International Law, Part II: Our Fragmenting Legal Community, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1049, 1065 (2012)
(“The term community is vague and over-used; it seems deeply weighted with meaning yet utterly abstract.”). My
goal is not to give the phrase more precise content but rather to address the conceptual question of how global
governance associations—what I am calling international communities—are established and maintained.
317
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governance associations. As I will explain, this theory is not just of academic interest. It has
far-reaching implications for the design and practice of international law.
The assumption that I aim to refute is evident in much of the literature on international
law. Take the prominent claim that a universal international community—the so-called
international community as a whole—must “embody [the] common interest[s] of all
States and, indirectly, of mankind.”2 Here, the community’s existence and strength are contingent on certain shared precepts.3 Thus, jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations—the
two principles in positive law that purport to deﬁne this community—are said to promise a
“‘higher unity,’ . . . the representation and prioritization of common interests as against the
egoistic interests of individuals.”4 By the same token, the regular disregard for those interests
and the diversity and discord in the world are thought to betray that any universal community
is only nascent or aspirational.5
The ﬂawed assumption also animates the principal interdisciplinary theories on
international law. These theories focus not on any universal community but on discrete
subcommunities that organize around speciﬁc governance issues. Various terms are
used for such communities: regimes,6 networks,7 interpretive communities,8 and so
2
Christian Tomuschat, Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their Will, 241 RECUEIL DES COURS
197, 227 (1993).
3
See also, e.g., HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY 13 (2d ed. 1995) (“A society of states (or international
society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in
the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another,
and share in the working of common institutions.” (emphasis omitted)); THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 10 (1995) (arguing that the international community is grounded in a
set of “shared moral imperatives and values”); LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 10 (Ronald
F. Roxburgh ed., 3d ed. 2005) (“[T]hese common interests, and the necessary intercourse which serves these interests, have long since united the separate States into an indivisible community.”); THOMAS WEATHERALL, JUS
COGENS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOCIAL CONTRACT 25 (2015) (“The idea of ‘community’ introduces the conceptualization of a collective with shared interests and values.”); Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter As
Constitution of the International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 529, 566 (1998) (“The international
community thus is a community based on an agreement on rules.”).
4
Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law, 250 RECUEIL DES COURS 219,
245 (1997); see also, e.g., Santiago Villalpando, The Legal Dimension of the International Community: How
Community Interests Are Protected in International Law, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 387, 394 (2010) (arguing that these
principles evince a “trend towards the protection of community interests”).
5
E.g., Kritsiotis, supra note 1, at 990–91 (arguing that any international community is shallow if it repeatedly
fails to realize values that it deﬁnes as foundational); Philip R. Trimble, International Law, World Order, and
Critical Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REV. 811, 816 (1990) (book review) (arguing that, because “we have no common, generally accepted world ideology,” we have not one international community but “many international communities . . . with their own distinctive values, practices, and belief systems”); Andreas Paulus, International
Community, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L., para. 28 (last updated Mar. 2013) (“[I]t appears
that in the view of the diversity of contemporary international law, ‘fragmentation’ rather than community has
become the key term to describe contemporary international society.” (citation omitted)).
6
Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (deﬁning “regimes” as “sets of implicit or explicit
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area
of international relations” (emphasis added)).
7
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 3, 15 (2004) (deﬁning “networks” as groups of governmental
ofﬁcials who share “speciﬁc aims and activities” and claiming that these networks portend a “new world order . . .
that institutionalizes cooperation and sufﬁciently contains conﬂict”).
8
IAN JOHNSTONE, THE POWER OF DELIBERATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW, POLITICS AND ORGANIZATIONS 42 (2011)
(deﬁning as a legal “interpretive community” those who “share a perspective and way of understanding the
world”).
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forth.9 Despite meaningful differences among these theories, they all deﬁne global governance associations by that which the participants share—common values, goals, interests,
or practices.10 Again, the participants’ commonalities are what bind them together.
Internal divisions are treated as weaknesses that must be overcome, lest they detract from
the association.11
The idea that an international community is rooted in common precepts and impeded by
internal discord portends a particular role for international law. It suggests that, in order to
establish and fortify global governance relationships, international law must reinforce the participants’ shared tenets and deter or defuse their disputes. For example, this is why many analysts describe as uniquely robust the community that centers at the World Trade
Organization (WTO): the participants share an elaborate set of rules and processes for promoting a common trade agenda and curbing the disputes that might otherwise get in the
way.12
In this article, I draw on work in political philosophy, sociology, and U.S. constitutional
legal theory to expose a problem with that conception of an international community and to
present an alternative that better captures a world with so much heterogeneity and division.
The alternative is a decidedly political community. Members are bound together in a joint
governance project and have certain practices and policies in common. But they also disagree,
at times intently and without substantive resolution, about core facets of their association.
The key difference between the now dominant conception and my own is that, here, irresolvable disagreements and disputes are not necessarily corrosive to the association. To the contrary, conﬂict can be and often is a unifying force that binds an international community
together.13 Thus, international law might construct a community—and bolster its
9
E.g., JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 80 (2010) (arguing that, as the participants in a “community of practice” “coalesce[] around the emergence of common histories,
values or norms,” a “deeper sense of community” develops); Cohen, supra note 1, at 1069 (“[A]n international
legal community is deﬁned by the rules of legitimate lawmaking that it shares.”); Peter M. Haas, Introduction:
Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 3 (1992) (deﬁning as an “epistemic
community” the actors who are uniﬁed by shared beliefs, notions of validity, and practices).
10
This is evident even in the language that is used to describe these communities. See supra notes 6–9 and
corresponding text; see also infra Part II.A.
11
See infra notes 27, 31–37 and corresponding text.
12
E.g., Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, International Law and the Limits of Macroeconomic Cooperation, 86 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1025, 1033–34 (2013); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits,
34 YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 125–26 (2009).
13
A few scholars have hinted at a similar claim but have not explored it or its implications in any depth. Most
notably, Martti Koskenniemi has said that “a universal community is not only presumed but constructed by an
international law that precisely due to its indeterminacy” invites conﬂict about its meaning and objectives. Martti
Koskenniemi, Legal Universalism: Between Morality and Power in a World of States, in LAW, JUSTICE, AND POWER:
BETWEEN REASON AND WILL 46, 62 (Sinkwan Cheng ed., 2004). Koskenniemi’s claim is that international law
gives political adversaries a shared foundation for arguing as equals and “in terms of an assumed universality.”
Martti Koskenniemi, What Is International Law For?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 57, 77 (Malcolm D. Evans ed.,
2d ed. 2006). Yet Koskenniemi does not elaborate on his claim, except to say that it supports formalism in,
and enables the emancipation through, international law. See id. Likewise, Amy Kapczynski uses the access to
knowledge movement to show that “engagement with law can bring actors locked in a struggle over law into alignment with one another” and thus can “have an integrative effect on social actors.” Amy Kapczynski, The Access to
Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 809–10 (2008).
Kapczynski concludes her study by suggesting that legal struggles might help create global polities. Id. at 881.
But she does not pursue that possibility or address it beyond the context of the access to knowledge movement.
Finally, Samantha Besson suggests that “[i]t is time to go beyond ‘dispute-settlement’-type conceptions of the
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governance project—not by consistently pressing for consensus or reconciliation but by at
times doing almost the opposite: enabling the participants to disagree.
The article proceeds as follows. Part II elaborates on the prevailing conception of an international community and then presents the theoretical construct for my alternative. I argue
that an international community is ultimately constituted through the participants’ interactions about their joint enterprise.14 These interactions can be harmonious but are often contentious. In groups that are, like many international communities, highly diverse or diffuse,
conﬂict plays a particularly important integrative role. Such groups need conﬂict to bind
themselves because their members otherwise have little in common or limited opportunities
to interact. To be sure, not all conﬂicts are constructive for the group; some are extremely
damaging. But conﬂicts that manifest in law have the unique potential to unify, even as
they divide, a group. The nature of a legal argument is to purport to speak not just for oneself
but on behalf of a group. The argument helps construct the group by presupposing that it
exists and then purporting to deﬁne its attributes. Further, some legal conﬂicts are especially
powerful in this respect. Building on Philip Bobbitt’s work in U.S. constitutional law, we can
call these conﬂicts “ethical” because they focus the participants on the ethos—the shape and
character—of the mutual association.15
Parts III and IV show that ethical conﬂict is routine in international law. Part III assesses
the two principles in positive law that expressly speak of an international community: jus
cogens norms and erga omnes obligations. These principles do not establish operative rules
of decision, so their relevance and role in the global order have long been uncertain.
I argue that they serve to foster ethical conﬂict. They invite global actors to ﬁght about
what an all-encompassing community is and stands for. They thus help construct the community as a going concern that binds the participants together. To clarify, my claim is not that
this community is robust or even that it is truly universal. My claim is that a community that
purports to be universal is constituted, not diminished, through ethical legal conﬂict.
Disputes about jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations unify the participants around a
shared governance project, even as the contours of that project remain contested. Part IV
shows that ethical legal conﬂict is not limited to those two principles. It also serves a unifying
function in highly integrated communities, like the one at the WTO. The WTO community

relations among independent albeit integrated legal orders and realise the integrating and community-shaping
capacity of conﬂict.” SAMANTHA BESSON, THE MORALITY OF CONFLICT 534 (2005). Besson’s discussion of this
point—particularly, of its relevance to modern international law—is brief.
14
The basic insight that global interactions can shape the participants’ identities and behavior ﬁnds support in
constructivist theories on international relations and international law. See Alexander Wendt, Constructing
International Politics, INT’L SECURITY 71–72 (1995) (“[T]he fundamental structures of international politics are social
rather than strictly material . . . and . . . these structures shape actors’ identities and interests. . . .”); see also PIERRE
BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 42 (Polity G. Raymond & J. Thompson trans., 1991) (describing
legal language as “creative speech which brings into existence that which it utters”).
15
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 94 (1982). In Constitutional Fate, Bobbitt described ethical argument
as resting on “a characterization of American institutions and the role within them of the American people.” Id. at
94–95. Bobbitt also advanced, as a particular vision of the U.S. constitutional ethos, the commitment to limited
government. Id. at 230. He and others have since recognized that that vision is too narrow and not the only plausible way to characterize the American ethos. See Philip Bobbitt, Reﬂections Inspired by My Critics, 72 TEX. L. REV.
1869, 1937 (1994); see also Richard Primus, Response, The Functions of Ethical Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. SEE
ALSO 79, 80–81 (2010).
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is constituted both by the participants’ shared precepts and by their protracted disagreements
and divisions.
Together, Parts II through IV argue that international legal conﬂict can have systemic value
either for particular regulatory arrangements or for the global order as a whole. This value does
not turn on whether the conﬂict is ultimately resolved and is sometimes best achieved by leaving it unresolved. The article thus counters the common view that international law matters to
the extent that it shapes behavior toward or otherwise advances speciﬁc policy objectives.16
Even when international law does not do that work, it might do other important work. It
might foster productive conﬂicts and thereby help preserve or fortify global governance relationships. Part V discusses some of the implications for the practice and theory of international law.
II. TWO CONCEPTIONS OF COMMUNITY
To start, I present two conceptions of an international community—the now dominant
one and my alternative. The two have important similarities. Each is a positive theory of how
an international community is constituted and sustained. Neither assumes that community
members will have a particular level or kind of attachment to the group. Connections to the
group might be affective or cognitive, and are likely to be ﬂuid and varied. Some members
might be extremely inﬂuential or invested in the community, while others are more peripheral
or disengaged. The community’s boundaries might even be contested or difﬁcult to ascertain.
The inquiry is not about the deﬁning criteria of an international community. It is about how a
recognizable community—a governance association that exists as a social fact—comes to be
and endure.
Because the theories are descriptive and analytic, they do not necessarily address related
normative questions, like whether particular communities are fair, who ought to participate
them, or what their governance projects ought to entail. My only normative assumption is
that it is desirable to have some fairly resilient international communities. An international
community shapes how the participants relate to and interact with one another in a given
domain of human activity; it provides the relational infrastructure for international law. As
such, having an international community makes any international legal project, if not possible, at least more easily realizable than it otherwise would be.17
Finally, both theories recognize that an international community is constituted at least in
part by its members’ commonalities. Shared interests, values, goals, or practices can bind the
16

This view is perhaps most evident in discussions of the efﬁcacy of international law. International law’s efﬁcacy is widely deﬁned in terms of whether it advances a prescribed policy, as if that is the only plausible metric for
assessing its impact. See, e.g., MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSIGHTS
FROM THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENFORCEMENT 11 (2008) (“[S]anctions . . . help to ensure that international
law compliance is occurring on a level sufﬁcient to consider it effective law.”); ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW
INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 13, 25, 29 (2008) (presenting as a theory of “how international law works” a theory about states’ compliance and attainment of shared gains); JENS DAVID OHLIN, THE
ASSAULT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 98, 101 (2015) (asserting that the “whole point of international law is to create a
structure whereby the cost of shifting strategy away from compliance becomes higher than it would be without
legal regulation in a particular area,” and that “[t]he status of international law as law is seriously called into doubt”
if it does not do that work).
17
On the point that an international legal practice is inherently interactional, see BRUNNÉE & TOOPE, supra
note 9.
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participants together and help construct their association. The ﬂaw in the dominant theory—
and the thing that distinguishes it from my own—is that it assumes that conﬂict detracts from
or evinces weaknesses in the community. I argue that conﬂict is often a unifying force that
binds and strengthens the community.
A. Community as Constituted by Shared Precepts
International legal theorists often suggest that an international community can be constituted only by commonality. The more that community members share, the thicker or stronger their community is thought to be. Of course, community members inevitably also
disagree. But in this conception, ineradicable diversity and discord detract from, rather
than enhance, the community. The community exists despite, not because of, those qualities.
Scholars who address the generic or universal international community almost always
ground it in shared interests or values.18 They treat disagreements and discord as evidence
that the community is weak. An approach that is especially prominent in Continental
Europe draws on the work of German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies. Tönnies famously distinguished between a community (gemeinschaft) and a society (gesellschaft) as two forms of
social ordering.19 He claimed that community bonds are stronger. Members of a society
are atomized and pursue only their own interests, but community members also act to
advance collective interests.20 Extending that logic to the global sphere means that the deﬁning feature of an international community is that it, too, advances collective interests—interests that belong not to speciﬁc states but to all of them or even to humanity itself. When
community members are divided by self-interest, their community is thought to be weak
or unrealized.21
Other accounts of the generic international community reﬂect similar themes. For example, James Brierly claimed that “the acid test of the reality of a community is that common
standards of conduct should be held with a conviction strong enough to induce its members
to take common action.”22 For Brierly, “the main and obvious cause” of the “weakness of the
18
See sources at supra notes 2–5. There is a notable exception. Myres McDougal, Michael Reisman, and
Andrew Willard explain that a “world community” is created through interdependence: “‘Community’ designates
interactions in which interdetermination or interdependence in the shaping and sharing of all values attain an
intensity at which participants in pursuit of their own objectives must regularly take account of the activities
and demands of others.” Myres S. McDougal, W. Michael Reisman & Andrew R. Willard, The World
Community: A Planetary Social Process, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 807, 809 (1988). These authors contend that,
once people recognize that they are interdependent, they do not necessarily act in the common interest, but
they make and assess claims in terms of a common interest. See id. at 810, 834, 846. That account of an international community is consistent with my own, though it does not speciﬁcally focus on conﬂict’s constitutive role.
19
FERDINAND TÖNNIES, COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY 52 (Jose Harris ed., Margaret Hollis trans., 2001).
20
Id.
21
See, e.g., TOMASZ WIDŁAK, FROM INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY TO INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (2015), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2707814 (distinguishing a “weaker, more pluralistic” society from a community that
has “a thicker and denser layer of common values, interests and norms” and that “reach[es] common goals in
the interest of the whole”); Simma, supra note 4, at 245 (“[T]he element which distinguishes a ‘community’
from its components is . . . the representation and prioritization of common interests as against the egoistic interests of individuals. A mere society (Gesellschaft) on the contrary, does not presuppose more than factual contacts
among a number of individuals.”).
22
James Leslie Brierly, The Rule of Law in International Society, in THE BASIS OF OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND OTHER PAPERS BY THE LATE JAMES LESLIE BRIERLY 250, 252 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 1958).
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community sense in international society” was the world’s division into strong subunits, in
the form of sovereign states.23 Likewise, Georges Abi-Saab has argued that an international
community depends on two factors: (1) “a community of interests or of values,” and (2) the
minimization of conﬂict “to manage the disintegration of the community.”24 Abi-Saab
claimed that “the end of the Cold War, far from pushing international society towards a
more integrated global international community, has introduced new dangers with new
bones of contention among the members of this society, which create the risk of making it
evolve in the opposite direction.”25 Abi-Saab’s worry was that disagreements and divisions
would erode the international community.
Over the past ﬁfteen or so years, international legal theory has become more interdisciplinary. The dominant interdisciplinary theories on international law focus not on any universal
community but on discrete subcommunities with issue-speciﬁc governance projects. These
theories still assume that a community is constituted by commonality and diminished by discord. Consider the rational choice approach in international relations. According to this
approach, global actors create joint governance associations in order to realize mutual objectives or solve common problems.26 That shared agenda is what binds the participants
together. And while they might at times disagree about the agenda, their disputes are treated
as obstacles to the governance project that ought to be overcome. Thus, most of the rational
choice scholarship on international law asks either how to buttress shared norms—usually,
norms that have been collectively prescribed in law—or how to deter or settle related
disputes.27
A similar assumption is evident in constructivist theories on “communities of practice,”
though as I will explain, some of these theories come closer to my own. Emanuel Adler
has deﬁned a community of practice as consisting of “people who are informally as well as
contextually bound by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice.”28
Adler acknowledges that community members occasionally disagree.29 Yet what deﬁnes
and unites them as a community is their “like-mindedness” and shared practice—common
“routines, words, tools, ways of doing things, stories, symbols, and discourse.”30 Legal
23

Id. at 254.
Georges Abi-Saab, Whither the International Community?, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 248, 251 (1998).
25
Id. at 265.
26
See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, 36 INT’L ORG. 325, 334 (1982)
(“Regimes are developed in part because actors in world politics believe that with such arrangements they will
be able to make mutually beneﬁcial agreements that would otherwise be difﬁcult or impossible to attain.”).
27
E.g., GUZMAN, supra note 16, at 13, 25, 29 (presenting a theory of how international law fosters compliance
with shared norms and thereby facilitates the attainment of mutual gains); BARBARA KOREMENOS, THE CONTINENT
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 4–10 (2016) (arguing that different institutions have unique design features to overcome
speciﬁc obstacles to the shared agendas); OHLIN, supra note 16, at 97, 103 (explaining that participants “gravitate
toward a particular legal norm and choose ‘compliance’ as their strategy” because “[d]efectors . . . lose all the beneﬁts of cooperation”); Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship,
106 AJIL 1, 6 (2012) (“In the rational institutionalist paradigm, international institutions facilitate state cooperation by reducing the transaction costs of negotiating international agreements with multiple parties, and by promoting compliance with them through monitoring and enforcement.”).
28
EMANUEL ADLER, COMMUNITARIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 15 (2005).
29
Id. at 22 (“The joint enterprise of members of a community of practice does not necessarily mean a common
goal or vision, although in most cases it does.”).
30
Id. at 15.
24
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scholars who build on Adler’s work to describe the communities that engage with international law likewise deﬁne these communities by that which the participants share. More telling, they cite ineradicable divisions as evidence either that the participants do not belong to
the same community or that their community is thin.31
Ian Johnstone’s account of what he calls “interpretive communities” is illustrative.32
According to Johnstone, an interpretive community consists of actors who participate in
the same ﬁeld of legal practice.33 What makes them a community seems to be that they
“share a perspective and way of understanding the world acquired through their immersion
in the law and interaction with one another.”34 Like Adler, Johnstone recognizes that these
participants “may not share all the same values.”35 Further, he underscores that conﬂict can be
constructive for a community because it can help the participants ﬁnd more common
ground.36 But Johnstone ultimately insists that “[i]f after extensive deliberation on an
issue international legal opinion is sharply divided”—in other words, if consensus is unattainable and the dispute persists—“then almost by deﬁnition no interpretive ‘community’ exists,
or perhaps there are multiple communities.”37 Here again, protracted disputes detract from or
betray weaknesses in the community.
B. Community as Constituted Partly by Conﬂict
A conception of community that is grounded in shared precepts and impeded by internal
division is oddly disconnected from the real world. Many global governance associations are,
at once, highly integrated and replete with diversity and discord. Below, I offer an alternative
conception that captures that reality. In this account, global actors engage together on a governance project, even as they disagree about its contours. The community is constituted
through their interactions about the joint project. These interactions have the potential to
31
E.g., BRUNNÉE & TOOPE, supra note 9, at 80 (arguing that a “‘thin’ community of international legal practice”
might exist on the basis of “very limited shared understandings” but that “a deeper sense of community” develops
as the participants “coalesce[] around the emergence of common histories, values or norms”); Cohen, supra note 1,
at 1066, 1067, 1069 (asserting that a “legal community . . . is constituted by its members shared acceptance of
certain ground rules and their shared expectations about good and bad argument,” so while members might disagree on substance, their “disagreements over the legitimacy of particular sources may mean that international law
is no longer deﬁned by a single legal community”); see also Peter M. Haas, Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic
Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control, 43 INT’L ORG. 377, 377, 380 (1989) (arguing that if an epistemic community “with a common perspective is able to acquire and sustain control over a substantive policy
domain,” it will “produce convergent state policies” and “the associated regime will become stronger”).
32
JOHNSTONE, supra note 8, at 33–54.
33
Id. at 41–44.
34
See id. at 42.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 32 (“Legal argumentation . . . does help to solidify agreement.”). Other scholars also underscore that
conﬂict is often part of the process of building a consensus or developing new norms. E.g., Thomas Risse, “Let’s
Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics, 54 INT’L ORG. 1, 7 (2000) (“Arguing implies that actors try to . . .
seek a communicative consensus about their understanding of a situation as well as justiﬁcations for the principles
and norms guiding their action.”); Stephen J. Toope, Formality and Informality, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 107, 123 (Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée & Ellen Hey eds., 2007)
(“[T]he process of normative evolution is oftentimes conﬂictual.”). These scholars suggest that conﬂict is constructive for a community to the extent that it reinforces or generates some common ground. However, they have not
questioned and at times seem to endorse the view that conﬂict itself betrays a deﬁciency and must be resolved in
order to realize any gains.
37
JOHNSTONE, supra note 8, at 44.
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construct and fortify the group no matter whether they are harmonious or persistently
conﬂictual.
1. Conﬂict’s Constitutive Role. The idea that conﬂict can constitute a community might
seem counterintuitive but is not new.38 Bernard Yack has attributed the idea to Aristotle himself. An Aristotelian community is, according to Yack, comprised of “individuals who differ
from each other in some signiﬁcant way.”39 Of course, that kind of diversity creates the
grounds for conﬂict. People with real differences invariably disagree about aspects of their
social organization. But as Yack explains, Aristotle understood diversity as “a necessary
element of community rather than the obstacle to social harmony that community seeks
to overcome.”40 People coalesce into a community not necessarily by overcoming their differences but by engaging together in what Aristotle called a practice of justice—a practice of
trying to establish and hold one another accountable to standards that are generalizable for the
group.41
The practice of justice helps unify a community both by solidifying areas of agreement and
by structuring persistent conﬂict. First, community members who engage in the practice
might eventually converge on a common substantive policy. If they do, the policy can be a
communal glue that binds them.42 Second, even when—as is more often the case—a practice
of justice “structures nothing more than the way we engage in conﬂict with each other, it still
reinforces the sense that we participate with others in a community.”43 It does so because the
people who partake in the practice presuppose that they are in a governance project together.
They might disagree about which substantive standards are appropriate for the group, or
about who may deﬁne or apply those standards. But in arguing about those issues, they
take for granted that the group has generalizable standards. They assume that the group is
a group.
The blend of commonality and conﬂict that binds a given community depends on its speciﬁc makeup. Yet highly heterogeneous and loosely structured communities are especially
dependent on conﬂict to unify and sustain themselves. Members of these communities
have little in common or few opportunities or reasons to interact. For them, the most plausible alternative to coalescing through conﬂict is not to coalesce through a drastic uptick in
social unity. It is to have a weaker community—one in which members are less connected to
the group or to its governance project.
38
See, e.g., LEWIS A. COSER, THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT 137 (1956) (“[C]onﬂict, rather than being
disruptive and dissociating, may indeed be a means of balancing and hence maintaining a society as a going concern.”); BERNARD CRICK, IN DEFENCE OF POLITICS 24 (1962) (“Diverse groups hold together . . . because they practice politics—not because they agree about ‘fundamentals’ . . . .”); MAX GLUCKMAN, CUSTOM AND CONFLICT IN
AFRICA 23 (1955) (“[C]ustom unites where it divides . . . .”); DON HERZOG, HOUSEHOLD POLITICS 128 (2013)
(“Conﬂict, I’ll argue, isn’t the opposite of social order. It’s what social order usually is.”); Albert
O. Hirschman, Social Conﬂicts as Pillars of Democratic Market Society, 22 POL. THEORY 203, 206 (1994) (reviewing
literature on how “social conﬂict produce[s] . . . valuable ties that hold modern democratic societies together and
provide them with the strength and cohesion they need”).
39
BERNARD YACK, THE PROBLEMS OF A POLITICAL ANIMAL 29 (1993).
40
Id. at 29–30; see also id. at 15 (“Aristotle argues against Plato that the elimination of social heterogeneity
threatens to eliminate political community itself; community signiﬁes for Aristotle a combination of sharing
and differentiation rather than social unity.” (citation omitted)).
41
Id. at 40–42.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
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To appreciate how conﬂict can constitute a group, imagine that dozens of loners live on a
deserted island. The islanders do not have much in common or much reason to ﬁght. They
have almost nothing to do with one another. We would hardly call their bunch a community.
Now imagine that they get together once a week to ﬁght over island resources. At each meeting, they disagree—ﬁercely and intently—over the use and distribution of the available
resources. Depending on the week, some islanders get what they want, while others bitterly
lose out. Here, they at least have a recognizable association. Their resource disputes help constitute, rather than diminish, their association because they congregate as a group in order to
have those disputes. Without the resources to ﬁght over, they would not interact or have a
common enterprise.44
It bears underscoring that a community that is constituted largely through conﬂict is not
necessarily weaker or more immature than one that displays high levels of social unity. Return
to the fantasy island. Assume now that the islanders terminate their weekly meetings and
anoint a king to make all resource decisions on their behalf. The king acts arbitrarily, but
the islanders follow his rule because they see themselves as his subjects and would rather
spend their time leading their loner lives than arguing over resources. In this scenario, the
islanders share a governance project and have minimal levels of conﬂict. If their earlier conﬂicts were corrosive to or did not help constitute their community, then anointing the king
would have strengthened their community. But surely, the group has become less cohesive
and integrated. The islanders are completely checked out of their governance project, no longer engaging together on it.
Some of the constructivist work on communities of practice gestures in a similar direction.
It highlights that international communities are constituted through social interaction.45 And
it acknowledges that the relevant interactions can be discordant.46 But because this work
ultimately deﬁnes a community by that which the members share—by their common practice—it misses, or at least does not press, the key conceptual claim that I am advancing here: a
community is constituted not just by commonality but also by disharmony and discord. In
order to interact as a group, the islanders needed a shared practice on when, where, and why
they would meet. But that base of commonality was insufﬁcient to generate their interactions.
They also needed conﬂict. Without the resource disputes, the islanders would not have created or used a shared practice—or, therefore, engaged together on their governance project.
Readers might intuit that the community would be stronger still if its members interacted
regularly and had minimal conﬂict. However, that vision of a community is completely unrealizable, and efforts to achieve it are often repressive.47 Even very homogenous and tight-knit
groups are replete with conﬂict. The commonalities that tie together the members of such
groups and cause their lives to be so intertwined also give them many reasons and occasions

44
To be clear, my point is not that the islanders have nothing in common. My point is that their community is
constituted both by their commonality—here, their shared project to allocate resources—and by the associated
conﬂicts. I amplify this point in the next few paragraphs.
45
ADLER, supra note 28, at 15, 23; BRUNNÉE & TOOPE, supra note 9, at 70, 72.
46
ADLER, supra note 28, at 21; BRUNNÉE & TOOPE, supra note 9, at 63.
47
HERZOG, supra note 38, at 146.
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to disagree.48 In other words, conﬂict can bring people together, but coming together also
brings conﬂict.49 It is a part of, not inherently corrosive to, a social order.
Because conﬂict is inevitable in social life, creating space for it to occur routinely and in
relatively productive ways serves an important systemic function; it helps stabilize and fortify a
community in the face of inevitable divisions. If nothing else, a conﬂict exposes individual
priorities and positions of relative strength or weakness within the group. When conﬂict is
routinized, a community has ample opportunity to adjust its social structure so that internal
strains do not become too intense to withstand.50 To be clear, this “rebalancing” does not
necessarily entail resolving or addressing the underlying dispute. The balance that is struck
at any particular moment might be transitory or contentious. The social structure’s contestability is itself what strengthens the association. It reduces the risk that tensions will build,
antagonistic alliances will harden, and conﬂicts will express themselves in more virulent ways.
Thus, even when a dispute does not lead to substantive change or resolution, it might serve to
clear the air and release pent up hostilities that would otherwise fester and become corrosive.51
The point is that conﬂict is not only inevitable in human groups; it can also be productive for
them.
It is not always. Some conﬂicts clearly diminish or threaten to tear apart a community. If
the weekly meetings on the island become too combative, attendance might drop. Some
islanders might prefer to do without the allocated resources than to engage with the group.
Alternatively, a dissatisﬁed bunch might revolt and form a splinter group that competes with
the original one for island resources. In either event, the community could dissipate. As several theorists have explained, however, the best way to avoid such destructive conﬂicts—and
to maintain the community as a going concern—is not to try to ignore, suppress, or resolve
intractable divisions. It is to enable community members to have their disputes routinely and
on terms that reinforce, rather than undercut, their mutual association.52 The trick, then, is to
foster the “right” kinds of conﬂict.
2. Law’s Constitutive Role. I argue in the remainder of the article that international law can
be an “eminently efﬁcient producer of integration and socialization” when it facilitates and
structures—but does not necessarily defuse—conﬂict.53 Some readers might object to the
48

For evidence, see Max Gluckman’s anthropological work, supra note 38.
See generally HERZOG, supra note 38, at 123–47.
50
COSER, supra note 38, at 79, 151–52.
51
CHANTAL MOUFFE, AGONISTICS 8 (2013) (“[When] passions cannot be given a democratic outlet . . . [t]he
ground is . . . [laid] for the multiplication of confrontations over non-negotiable moral values, with all the manifestations of violence that such confrontations entail.”); COSER, supra note 38, at 41 (“Conﬂict serves as an outlet
for the release of hostilities which, were no such outlet provided, would sunder the relation between antagonists.”);
GEORG SIMMEL, CONFLICT: THE WEB OF GROUP AFFILIATIONS 27 (1955) (“The sharpening of contrasts may be
provoked directly for the sake of its own diminution . . . in the expectation that the antagonism, once it reaches
a certain limit, will end because of exhaustion or the realization of its futility.”).
52
E.g., supra notes 41–43 and corresponding text (discussing the Aristotelian practice of justice); CHANTAL
MOUFFE, ON THE POLITICAL 20 (2005) (explaining that adversaries “must see themselves as belonging to the
same political association . . . [and] sharing a common symbolic space,” even as they continue to disagree);
COSER, supra note 38, at 157 (“Conﬂict tends to be dysfunctional for a social structure in which there is no or
insufﬁcient toleration and institutionalization of conﬂict.”); cf. Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80
S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1164, 1166 (2007) (arguing that mechanisms that “deliberately seek to create or preserve
spaces for conﬂict among multiple, overlapping legal systems” “can potentially help to channel (or even tame)
normative conﬂict” (emphasis omitted)).
53
Hirschman, supra note 38, at 206.
49
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very idea that this is what international law does. I start by addressing that objection. Next, I
look to U.S. constitutional legal theory for insights on how legal conﬂict can construct a political community. In Parts III and IV of the article, I apply these insights to international law.
a. Law as the ground rules for conﬂict
Many international lawyers deﬁne international law as a tool not for conﬂict but for consensus and reconciliation.54 They treat conﬂict as if it either operates outside of international
law, in the domain of politics,55 or is a problem for international law to mitigate.56 For these
lawyers, the claim that international law afﬁrmatively enables conﬂict might seem apocryphal.
However, a prominent school of thought already deﬁnes international law as an argumentative practice. International law establishes a set of ground rules—texts, processes, methods,
sources of authority, and so on—that structure cross-border interactions. The interactions
can be congenial. Participants can use the ground rules to identify and work toward common
aims. But the interactions can also be contentious. Adversaries use the same ground rules to
compete and disagree with one another.57
I have built on that idea in other work to make three claims that set the stage for my argument
here.58 First, international law does not merely channel the conﬂicts that would occur in its
absence. International law afﬁrmatively enables conﬂict. Having shared ground rules helps the
participants crystallize and focus on their disagreements. It gives them normative ammunition
to condemn particular situations as problematic. It establishes mechanisms through which they
can communicate their discontent and demand change. And it creates incentives to ﬁght by
54
The doctrine on sources itself deﬁnes international law in consensual terms. See, e.g., Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 ICJ REP. 14, para. 269
(June 27) (“[I]n international law there are no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by the State concerned. . . .”).
55
E.g., ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, THE INTERPRETATION OF ACTS AND RULES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 29
(2008) (“[P]olitical considerations are inherently subjective and can be subjectively manipulated, unlike agreed
and accepted rules of law. . . .”); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (6th ed. 2008) (“Power politics
stresses competition, conﬂict and supremacy . . . [while] law aims for harmony and the regulation of disputes.”).
56
E.g., RATNER, supra note 1, at 1 (“International law represents a system of norms and processes for resolving
competing claims. . . .”); Anthony D’Amato, Groundwork for International Law, 108 AJIL 650, 653 (2014) (“The
international legal system . . . tends to evolve norms that reduce friction and controversies among states and to
foster systemic equilibrium by prescribing how controversies may be avoided, mitigated, or resolved.”); Rosalyn
Higgins, Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Address at the American Society of International Law Annual Dinner
(Apr. 6, 1995), in 89 ASIL PROC. 293, 293 (1995) (“There is now a considerable feeling, resting upon quite discrete norms of public international law and upon good common sense, that even disputes whose continuance can
not be said to endanger international peace should be settled as harmoniously as possible.”); Anne Peters,
International Dispute Settlement: A Network of Cooperational Duties, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 9–11 (2003) (asserting
that a “dispute itself implies disagreement and non-cooperation” and must be overcome to avoid “the danger of an
impasse in dispute settlement” (emphasis added)).
57
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 565,
567–68 (2d ed. 2006) (describing international law as a shared grammar that does not necessarily reﬂect the participants’ shared substantive commitments but instead structures an argumentative practice); Cohen, supra note 1,
at 1067 (“Law provides a medium for debate and agreement, requiring actors to engage with each other in very
speciﬁc fora using very speciﬁc language and procedures.”); Ingo Venzke, Semantic Authority, Legal Change and the
Dynamics of International Law, 12 NO FOUNDATIONS 1, 2, 12 (2015) (arguing that “[t]he law provides the battleground for competing claims,” such that “different actors with varying degrees of semantic authority struggle” over
its meaning).
58
Monica Hakimi, The Work of International Law, 58 HARV. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript on ﬁle
with author).
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promising material or normative support if they prevail. In all of these ways, international law gives
global actors the tools and sometimes the reasons to disagree; it facilitates and even fuels their conﬂicts.59 In Parts III and IV of the article, I offer speciﬁc examples of international law doing this
work. For now, I emphasize that, as a positive matter, it is part of what international law does.
Second, although international law is an argumentative practice, the conﬂicts that it
enables are not only discursive or conﬁned to legal arenas. Law is a social phenomenon
that interacts with and shapes how people experience the material world.60 Just as global
actors use international law to foster real-world collaborations, so too do they use it to foster
real-world conﬂicts. In other words, international law enables conﬂicts that manifest in operationally relevant ways—through economic restrictions, deteriorated diplomatic relationships, and the like. The fact that it does is not necessarily problematic because, again,
conﬂict is part of any social order.61
Third, the effect of using international law to disagree is not always to defuse the dispute or
achieve some kind of reconciliation. The key insight of global legal pluralism is that the actors
who engage with international law have diverse, sometimes incompatible views on how best
to organize themselves.62 These actors at times ﬁnd ways to compromise. But other times,
reconciliation seems too costly, and separation is infeasible. In these latter cases, they still
use international law. They use it to disagree.63
b. The unifying effects of legal conﬂict
Though a protracted legal conﬂict is divisive in some sense, it can also be unifying. Legal
arguments are structured like the Aristotelian practice of justice. Adversaries purport to speak
not just in their own interests but on behalf of a group. Whatever the law requires, it is presumed to establish generalizable standards for the group.64 Thus, even as a legal conﬂict pits
community members against one another, it can reinforce the association.
The idea that legal conﬂict can help constitute a political community has been developed in
U.S. constitutional theory. To be clear, the idea is that conﬂict itself does this work. A conﬂict
59
Id. On the more general point that having shared ground rules helps people disagree, see HERZOG, supra note
38, at 134–41.
60
See, e.g., STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS 133–34, 210–11 (2d ed. 2004); Robert M. Cover,
The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4–5 (1983) (“Once
understood in the context of the narratives that give it meaning, law becomes not merely a system of rules to
be observed, but a world in which we live.”).
61
Hakimi, supra note 58.
62
PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS 145 (2012)
(“[N]ormative conﬂict is unavoidable. . . .”); NICO KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST
STRUCTURE OF POSTNATIONAL LAW 69 (2010) (“In pluralism, there is no common legal point of reference to appeal
to for resolving disagreement; conﬂicts are solved through convergence, mutual accommodation—or not at all.”);
see also Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1507 (1988) (explaining that pluralism “doubts or
denies our ability to communicate [diverse normative experiences] in ways that move each other’s views on disputed normative issues towards felt (not merely strategic) agreement without deception, coercion, or other
manipulation”).
63
Hakimi, supra note 58.
64
See K.N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE
JURISPRUDENCE 277 (1941) (explaining that, in law, “claims get made and urged in terms of the Order” and “tend
powerfully to be set up as serving the welfare of the relevant Entirety”); YACK, supra note 39, at 57 (“In political
communities the standards that deﬁne this sense of mutual obligation are expressed in laws, that is, in public rules
open to discussion and revision.”).
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need not be resolved, and might best be left unresolved, to nurture a community. For example, Robert Post and Reva Siegel argue that, on some issues in constitutional law, “authoritative settlement is neither possible nor desirable.”65 The right to an abortion is their example.
Because Americans disagree about this right, it has been pliable and contentious for decades.
Post and Siegel contend that, “[s]o long as groups continue to argue about the meaning of our
common Constitution, so long do they remain committed to a common constitutional enterprise.”66 By this account, the Constitution is “a discursive medium through which individuals
and groups engage in disputes about ideal forms of collective life.”67 Such disputes can
“strengthen social cohesion and constitutional legitimacy in a normatively heterogeneous
nation like our own” precisely because the Constitution is a “powerful symbol of common
American commitments”—a key referent that deﬁnes Americans as a community.68 An
intense and protracted constitutional conﬂict can bring Americans together to ﬁght about
their joint enterprise.
Further, several scholars have underscored that, in the face of deep normative divisions,
such engagement with the enterprise is best sustained by keeping the law pliable.69 The
Constitution’s contestability allows people with competing perspectives to continue tapping
into and arguing through it—using constitutional law to partake in the governance project.
By contrast, high levels of legal settlement risk estranging dissatisﬁed groups from the law.70
That risk might be especially pronounced for an international community. Whereas
Americans who are boxed out of constitutional law have other opportunities to participate
in communal life, such opportunities are more attenuated at the global level.
c. Ethical legal conﬂict
The analogy between constitutional law and international law is imperfect because the U.S.
Constitution has symbolic and normative power that is unparalleled at the international level.
Although the United Nations Charter is sometimes described as the constitution of the international community,71 it does not invoke the same sense of belonging and collective project.

65
Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 373, 378 (2007).
66
Id. at 427.
67
Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U.
PA. L. REV. 297, 326 (2001).
68
Post & Siegel, supra note 65, at 405; see also Michelman, supra note 62, at 1513 (noting the “conscious reference by those involved to their mutual and reciprocal awareness of being co-participants not just in this one
debate, but in a more encompassing common life . . .”).
69
See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conﬂict and Constitutional Change: The Case
of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1328, 1418–19 (2006) [hereinafter Siegel, Constitutional Culture];
Kapczynski, supra note 13, at 882 (arguing that “[r]estricted terms” might “be less attractive for groups seeking to
mobilize than elaborated terms, which are more ﬂexible and universalistic”); Christopher L. Kutz, Just
Disagreement: Indeterminacy and Rationality in the Rule of Law, 103 YALE L.J. 997, 1004 (1994) (“[A] legal system
is healthiest when there is conﬂict and dissent among its claims, because even irresolvable conﬂict is a sign of energy
and attention.”); Michelman, supra note 62, at 1529 (“Legal indeterminacy in that sense is the precondition of the
dialogic, critical-transformative dimension of our legal practice . . . .”).
70
Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 69, at 1328.
71
E.g., Fassbender, supra note 3; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United
Nations Revisited, 1997 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 1, 33.
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However, there is a particular kind of constitutional argument—ethical argument—that has
analogs in international law and is especially suitable for constructing a community.
As Philip Bobbitt described it, ethical argument calls attention to the ethos—the shape and
character—of a governance association. Such argument invokes the community’s ethos,
either expressly or by implication, as a justiﬁcation or source of authority for concrete legal
positions. Bobbitt underscored that ethical argument is not the same as moral argument. It
does not “claim that a particular solution is right or wrong in any sense larger than that the
solution comports with the sort of people we are and the norms we have chosen to solve political and customary constitutional problems.”72 Ethical argument helps construct a community by purporting to deﬁne it: Who belongs to the community, what does it stand for, and
how has it chosen to address core facets of social or political life?
Part of Bobbitt’s claim is that ethical argument permeates U.S. constitutional law, even
though it is not always presented as such. Take the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
District of Columbia v. Heller.73 The decision rests on an account of U.S. founding history
to justify an expansive interpretation of the Second Amendment right to bear ﬁrearms. The
dominant mode of reasoning in Heller is, on its face, originalist. As some constitutional lawyers have explained, however, originalism is itself a form of ethical argument.74 It is about how
Americans imagine themselves as a polity. Richard Primus argues that, although Heller’s discursive form is originalist, “[i]ts substance and its persuasive power are matters of ethos.”75 He
characterizes originalist arguments as ethical because their normative force “depends less on
the accuracy of their historical accounts—or the plausibility of their theories of intertemporal
authority—than on whether their audiences recognize themselves, or perhaps their idealized
selves, in the portrait of American origins that is on offer.”76 Heller put at issue the question of
“whether twenty-ﬁrst-century Americans (and in particular twenty-ﬁrst-century American
ofﬁcials) are disposed to see the keeping and use of ﬁrearms as near the core of what makes
them Americans and what connects them to the American past.”77 As such, Heller was not
just about the particular gun regulation in the District of Columbia. It was also about whether
gun culture is part of who Americans are.
Of course, Americans disagree on that question, as they do on many other ethical questions. Even when ethical argument is used to reinforce a norm that is deeply held and uncontroversial, like the First Amendment right to freedom of expression, Americans contest its
content or implementation in particular settings. This means that the ethos is unstable
and contestable. The “true” ethos might not be discernable, and arguments about it might
not be reliable indicators of what it really is.78 To say that lawyers use ethical argument is to
say that they put the ethos at issue and make it part of what is at stake in concrete legal battles
or decisions.79 Here, law can be the mechanism through which community members ﬁght
72

BOBBITT, supra note 15, at 94–95.
554 U.S. 570 (2008). I take this example and analysis from Primus, supra note 15, at 80.
74
Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originialism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 73 (2009); Primus, supra note 15, at 79.
75
Primus, supra note 15, at 80.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
See Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1133–35 (2013); Jack
M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 678 (2013).
79
See Primus, supra note 15, at 82, 89.
73
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about the contours of their governance association—and in the process, construct it as a going
concern that binds them.
III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PARADIGMS
In international law, ethical argument is most evident in two principles that expressly
invoke the international community as a whole: (1) jus cogens norms, and (2) erga omnes obligations. As these principles are articulated in positive law, they portray a community that is
uniﬁed by shared precepts. The principles are said to embody and protect values that are foundational to all of humanity. That idea has had enormous symbolic force over the past several
decades. But its descriptive and analytic purchase are limited. Although jus cogens norms and
erga omnes obligations are regularly cited as positive law, their content is so nebulous, and their
operational effect is so negligible, that they have an almost illusory quality.80 They do not
meaningfully foster the kind of community that they depict on their face—one uniﬁed by
core values.
I contend that jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations help constitute an international
community not by deﬁning commitments that are universally shared but by inviting loosely
connected actors to battle over what those commitments are or might be. In other words, the
principles enable ethical conﬂicts. They establish ground rules for disparate actors to argue
about the tenets of this community on terms that presuppose that it is a community. This
community might not be robust or even truly universal. While some global actors are clearly
very invested in it, many others—not to mention the people whom it claims to represent—
are not. The point is that it is constituted, not corroded, by the conﬂicts that jus cogens norms
and erga omnes obligations invite. Its shallowness as a community results less from the participants’ heterogeneity and divisions than from their overall disconnection and scarce opportunities for serious, broad-based engagement with the group.
I present this account of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations in order to advance my
broader claim about the constitutive effects of international legal conﬂict. I also make a more
discrete contribution. I explain what the principles on jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations actually do in the global order. These principles have received enormous scholarly
attention, but we still lack a compelling theory that accounts for the combination of persistence, rhetorical power, and opacity that they display in practice. As I show, that combination
makes them particularly apt for fostering ethical conﬂicts.

80
Others have recognized as much. E.g., CHRISTIAN J. TAMS, ENFORCING OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (2d ed. 2010) (“[T]here is no agreement about the scope of the erga omnes concept, and
the legal consequences ﬂowing from that status remain unclear.”); Andrea Bianchi, Human Rights and the Magic of
Jus Cogens, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 491, 505 (2008) (“Uncertainty remains about the operational mode of this normative category.”); Ian Brownlie, To What Extent Are the Traditional Categories of Lex Lata and Lex Ferenda Still
Viable?, in CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 66, 71 (Joseph Weiler & Antonio Cassese eds.,
1988) (describing erga omnes obligations as “very mysterious indeed”); Ulf Linderfalk, The Effect of Jus Cogens
Norms: Whoever Opened Pandora’s Box, Did You Ever Think About the Consequences?, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 853, 854–
55 (2007) (“If we search the international law literature for information on the possible normative content and
effects of jus cogens norms, it will provide but a very diffused picture.”).
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A. The Doctrinal Muddle
To appreciate how jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations constitute a community, we
ﬁrst must understand their instantiation in positive law. The principles are regularly invoked
and endorsed with language that puts them at the heart of the global order. However, they do
not establish operative rules of decision or otherwise seem to promote speciﬁc substantive
interests.
1. Jus Cogens Norms. Jus cogens norms are deﬁned in positive law as peremptory and foundational to the international community as a whole.81 States ﬁrst collectively endorsed the
principle in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).82 Since then,
authoritative bodies have consistently invoked it.83
Still, we lack criteria for identifying the norms that qualify as jus cogens.84 The set is usually
said to include the prohibitions of armed aggression, genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, slavery, torture, racial discrimination, and denials of the right to self-determination.85 That set is not necessarily exhaustive, but efforts to expand it or to articulate a workable standard for inclusion have been unavailing.86 Take the common refrain that jus cogens
norms protect fundamental community values.87 This standard is too blunt to guide decisions or capture current expectations. For example, most jus cogens lists include the prohibition of race-based discrimination but not the prohibition of sex-based discrimination. Are we
to understand that one is more highly or widely valued? If so, what is the basis for that posi-

81
In early usage, the relevant community was described as a community of states. Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, Art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 [hereinafter VCLT]. Now, the community is widely
understood to include other kinds of actors. Thus, authoritative references no longer deﬁne the community as
comprised exclusively of states. See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain),
Judgment, 1970 ICJ REP. 3, para. 33 (Feb. 5) [hereinafter Belgium v. Spain]; Int’l Law Comm’n, The Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries, Art. 25, cmt. 18, in
Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, UN Doc. A/56/10, GAOR 56th
Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001) [hereinafter DARSIWA].
82
VCLT, supra note 81, Art. 53.
83
E.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Dem. Rep. Congo
v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, 2006 ICJ REP. 6, para. 64 (Feb. 3) [hereinafter Dem.
Rep. Congo v. Rwanda]; Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT–95–17/I–T, Trial Judgment, 121 ILR
218, para. 153 (10 Dec. 1998); DARSIWA, supra note 81, Arts. 26, 40.
84
See DARSIWA, supra note 81, Art. 26, cmt. 5; William E. Conklin, The Peremptory Norms of the International
Community, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 837, 838 (2012) (“[D]espite their acknowledged universality, it remains unclear
which norms are peremptory.”); Dinah Shelton, International Law and ‘Relative Normativity,’ in INTERNATIONAL
LAW 159, 164 (Malcom D. Evans ed., 2006) (“It is a concept without an agreed content and one that is not widely
endorsed by State practice.”).
85
DARSIWA, supra note 81, Art. 26, cmt. 5.
86
I focus in the main text on one such effort, but there are others. E.g., DARSIWA, supra note 81, Art. 40, cmt. 3
(asserting that jus cogens norms proscribe conduct that is “intolerable because of the threat it presents to the survival
of States and their peoples and the most basic human values”); ROBERT KOLB, PEREMPTORY INTERNATIONAL LAW—
JUS COGENS 3 (2015) (arguing that jus cogens norms are deﬁned not by their substantive content but by their nonderogable effect); Conklin, supra note 84, at 856 (arguing that jus cogens norms are norms that are “conditions for
the very existence of the international legal order”). Despite these efforts, the deﬁnitional question remains.
87
E.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Dem. Rep.
Congo v. Rwanda), Judgment, 2006 ICJ REP. 86, para. 10 (separate opinion by Dugard, J.); ALEXANDER
ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 47 (2008); Simma, supra note 4, at 285–88.
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tion? Both forms of discrimination are proscribed in treaties that are almost universally ratiﬁed.88 And alas, both are pervasive in this world.
Moreover, no matter which norms qualify as jus cogens, the operational relevance of the
designation appears to be negligible. The VCLT suggests otherwise because it articulates a
strict rule of preemption. Under the VCLT, jus cogens norms invalidate contrary treaty obligations.89 As a matter of practice, however, that rule is rarely, if ever, implemented.90 States
generally do not claim the right to contract out of recognized jus cogens norms, just as they do
not claim that right for many other international legal norms. When they commit the proscribed conduct, they claim that they do not. The legal question then becomes what a particular jus cogens norm requires or whether a state has violated it in the case at hand, not
whether it or a contrary norm applies.
Further, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has consistently declined to treat a norm’s
jus cogens status as relevant to its judicial enforceability. The jus cogens status does not override
the usual requirement that states consent to ICJ jurisdiction.91 Neither does it override the
customary law on foreign state immunity. As the ICJ explained in its 2012 judgment in
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, one state may not exercise jurisdiction over another simply by asserting a jus cogens violation.92 The ICJ’s jurisprudence thus limits the authority of
international or national courts to enforce jus cogens norms. Although these norms might at
times be judicially enforceable, their enforceability does not turn on their jus cogens status, at
least not under international law.93
Admittedly, the International Law Commission (ILC) has claimed that the jus cogens designation matters in other ways—speciﬁcally, under the law on state responsibility.94 The
claim is that, when one state grossly or systematically violates a jus cogens norm, all other states
have duties: (1) not to contribute to the violation, (2) not to recognize as lawful a situation
88

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 UNTS 13; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 2(1), opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 UNTS 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Art. 2(2),
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 UNTS 3; The International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 UNTS 195.
89
VCLT, supra note 81, Arts. 53, 64, 71.
90
Egon Schwelb’s 1967 statement still resonates: “There appears to be no case on record in which an international court or arbitral tribunal decided that an international treaty was void because of repugnancy to a peremptory rule, in which an international political organ made a decision or recommendation to this effect, or where, in
settling a dispute, governments have agreed on such a proposition.” Egon Schwelb, Some Aspects of International
Jus Cogens as Formulated by the International Law Commission, 61 AJIL 946, 949–50 (1967). For a more recent
review of the practice, see Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AJIL 291, 304–17
(2006).
91
See Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda, supra note 83, para. 64 (“The fact that a dispute relates to compliance with a
[jus cogens] norm . . . cannot of itself provide a basis for [] jurisdiction. . . .”).
92
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.; Greece Intervening), Judgment, 2012 ICJ REP. 99, Feb. 2,
2012, paras. 93–95 [hereinafter Germany v. Italy].
93
Some have asserted that a norm’s jus cogens status provides a basis for a state’s national courts to exercise
universal jurisdiction—that is, to adjudicate claims that lack any nexus to that state. As others have explained,
however, the support for this assertion in the operational practice is weak. To the extent that states exercise jurisdiction in cases involving jus cogens norms, they very rarely rely or need to rely on the jus cogens principle. See
Markus Petsche, Jus Cogens as a Vision of the International Legal Order, 29 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 233, 250–
52 (2010).
94
DARSIWA, supra note 81, Arts. 26, 40, 41.
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resulting from the violation, and (3) to cooperate to end the violation.95 The ILC’s claim is
weak. Despite what the ILC says, its ﬁrst two duties do not turn on the jus cogens designation.
The ﬁrst applies more broadly. States must refrain from contributing to international legal
violations generally, not just when a jus cogens norm is at stake.96 The ILC’s second duty
at best applies more narrowly—only to the prohibitions on aggression and self-determination. In other words, states might have to refrain from recognizing as lawful situations resulting from a violation of one of those two prohibitions. But comparable duties have not been
established for other jus cogens norms.97
As for a duty to cooperate to end jus cogens violations, the ILC itself acknowledged in 2001
that the duty might not be positive law.98 The ICJ has since endorsed something like this duty
in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.99
Without using the phrase “jus cogens,” the Wall opinion asserts that, “[g]iven the character
and importance” of the relevant norms, all states must work to end Israel’s violations of
humanitarian law and of the Palestinian right to self-determination.100 The opinion thus
might indicate that a duty to cooperate is gaining legal traction. But for now, this duty
remains almost entirely aspirational—both in the case of the Palestinian situation and
more generally.101 Any effect of the jus cogens designation is still, at best, marginal.
2. Erga Omnes Obligations. The law on erga omnes obligations follows a similar script.
These obligations entered mainstream legal thinking with the ICJ’s 1970 judgment in
Barcelona Traction, Light & Power.102 The judgment declared in dicta that erga omnes obligations are owed to “the international community as a whole” such that “all States . . . have a
legal interest in their protection.”103 The ICJ has since attached the erga omnes label to norms
that are widely accepted as jus cogens.104 One might reasonably infer, then, that obligations to
comply with jus cogens norms are erga omnes—owed to everyone at once. Beyond that basic
inference, the law in this area remains opaque.

95

Id. Art. 41.
Id. Art. 16.
97
All of the practice that the ILC cites to support its second duty concerns these two prohibitions. Id. Art. 41,
cmts. 4–10. In the 2004 advisory opinion in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 ICJ 131, para. 159 (July 9) [hereinafter Construction of a Wall],
the ICJ picked up on the ILC’s claim to assert that “all States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal
situation resulting from the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory . . . .” This language is
best interpreted to mean that states may not recognize as lawful any forcible annexation of Palestinian territory. As
Judge Kooijmans has explained, any other interpretation suggests a meaningless “duty not to recognize an illegal
fact.” Id. (separate opinion by Kooijmans, J., para. 44).
98
DARSIWA, supra note 81, Art. 41, cmt. 3.
99
Construction of a Wall, supra note 97.
100
Id., para. 159.
101
See Monica Hakimi, Toward a Legal Theory on the Responsibility to Protect, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. 247, 254–56
(2014) (reviewing practice); see also Andreas L. Paulus, Jus Cogens in a Time of Hegemony and Fragmentation: An
Attempt at a Re-appraisal, 74 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 297, 315 (2005) (asserting that “there is not much” to the ILC’s
enforcement duties and that the ICJ’s failure to speak in jus cogens terms “has weakened the concept, not strengthened it”).
102
Belgium v. Spain, supra note 81.
103
Id., para. 33.
104
Id., para. 34; Construction of a Wall, supra note 97, para. 157.
96
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Nearly ﬁve decades since Barcelona Traction, we have little guidance on how an obligation
becomes erga omnes or whether the category extends beyond jus cogens norms.105 We also
know little about its practical effect. The famous dicta in Barcelona Traction arguably suggest
that the deﬁning feature of an erga omnes obligation is that any state may enforce it, no matter
whether the state is uniquely injured by a breach.106 In other words, erga omnes obligations
might ground a universal enforcement right. But that just begs the question of what such a
right would entail or how it would turn on the erga omnes designation.
The three most plausible answers are all unsatisfying. First, the designation might entitle
states to initiate judicial proceedings against a scofﬂaw.107 If states have this right, it remains
untested. An international court has never admitted a claim solely on the basis of an erga omnes
designation. The ICJ would conceivably do so only in exceedingly rare cases—where it already
has jurisdiction and cannot ground the claim in treaty law.108 Second, the erga omnes designation might entitle states to protest a violation through diplomatic or other informal channels.
States may engage in such protest no matter whether an erga omnes obligation is at issue.109
The third possibility is more complicated. The erga omnes designation might entitle states
to target the scofﬂaw with unfriendly measures, like economic restrictions. Some of these
measures are permissible no matter whether an erga omnes obligation is violated.110
The most that can be said about the others is that the law is unsettled. The question is whether
all states may respond to an erga omnes violation with countermeasures—measures that would
105

The two main theories for answering this question point in different directions. One justiﬁes erga omnes
obligations in terms of the “importance of the rights involved.” Belgium v. Spain, supra note 81, para. 33;
TAMS, supra note 80, at 128–57. Under this theory, obligations to comply with jus cogens norms are erga omnes
because they protect interests that are universal and foundational to the community. This theory implies that erga
omnes obligations are limited to the jus cogens set; other norms are not as important. According to the second theory, erga omnes obligations arise from the structure of the rights involved. Violations affect all states at once, rather
than speciﬁc states at a time. See Claudia Annacker, The Legal Regime of Erga Omnes Obligations in International
Law, 46 AUSTRIAN J. PUB. INT’L L. 131, 136 (1994). This second theory is potentially more expansive than the ﬁrst
because a broader range of obligations might reasonably be characterized as affecting all states at once. E.g.,
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 ICJ REP. 7, paras. 114–19 (Sept. 25) (separate
opinion by Vice-President Weermantry) (environmental obligations).
106
See Giorgio Gaja, Obligations Erga Omnes, International Crimes and Jus Cogens: A Tentative Analysis of
Three Related Concepts, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ILC’S DRAFT ARTICLE
19 ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY, 151, 156 (Joseph H. Weiler, Antonio Cassese & Marina Spinedi eds., 1989) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATE]. I say “arguably” because Barcelona Traction elsewhere suggests that any
enforcement right must be grounded either in a treaty or in another rule of customary law. Belgium v. Spain, supra
note 81, para. 91; see also, e.g., Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Fourth Report on the Content, Forms
and Degrees of International Responsibility, Int’l Law Comm’n, para. 100, UN Doc. A/CN.4/366 (Apr. 14–15,
1983) (by Willem Riphagen) (“[T]he presence of a collective interest . . . should imply a collective decision-making
machinery as regards reprisals. . . .”).
107
DARSIWA, supra note 81, Art. 48; cf. Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute and Extradite
(Belg. v. Sen.), 2012 ICJ REP. 422, paras. 68–69 (July 20) (ﬁnding that the treaty at issue establishes “obligations
erga omnes partes,” meaning that “[a]ll the States parties ‘have a legal interest’ in the protection of the rights
involved” and each state party has standing “to make a claim concerning the cessation of an alleged breach by
another State party”) (quoting Belgium v. Spain, supra note 81, para. 33).
108
See TAMS, supra note 80, at 159–62, 324.
109
DARSIWA, supra note 81, Art. 42, cmt. 2 (“There is in general no requirement that a State which wishes to
protest against a breach of international law by another State or remind it of its international responsibilities in
respect of a treaty or other obligation by which they are both bound should establish any speciﬁc title or interest to
do so.”).
110
A state that is not uniquely injured may take unfriendly measures if the measures are: (1) not otherwise
prescribed by international law (so-called “retorsions”), or (2) authorized by an international organ, like the
UN Security Council, that may override an acting state’s contrary obligations.
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ordinarily be unlawful but are excused as self-help enforcement.111 The ILC Draft Articles on
State Responsibility are widely thought to reﬂect the customary international law in this area
and suggest that the answer is no. According to the ILC, countermeasures may be taken only
by a state that is uniquely injured by the violation.112 The ILC speciﬁcally declined to recognize an exception for violations of erga omnes obligations, but it indicated that such an
exception might develop in the future.113 Scholars have since looked to state practice to
argue that the exception has become or is becoming positive law.114 So, erga omnes obligations
might ground a universal right to take countermeasures, but any such right is tenuous and has
not been widely endorsed.115
B. The Analytic Gap
Commentators appreciate that the principles on jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations do not do what they purport to do—that despite their powerful rhetoric, they do not
meaningfully advance universal interests on behalf of the whole world.116 Most analysts interpret this to mean either that the principles are not fully realized or that they betray the limits of
any international community or of international law itself.117 Analysts rarely entertain the
possibility that the principles do something other than they say.
To be sure, some scholars claim that the principles serve an expressive or symbolic function by
signaling that certain norms are uniquely important and not negotiable.118 However, expressive
111

DARSIWA, supra note 81, Arts. 22, 49–53.

112

Id. Art. 54, cmt. 6.
Id.
114
See ELENA KATSELLI PROUKAKI, THE PROBLEM OF ENFORCEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: COUNTERMEASURES,
THE NON-INJURED STATE AND THE IDEA OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 206 (2010); TAMS, supra note 80, at 208–
51; Martin Dawidowicz, Public Law Enforcement Without Public Law Safeguards? An Analysis of State Practice on
Third-Party Countermeasures and Their Relationship in the UN Security Council, 77 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 333, 350–
417 (2006).
115
See PROUKAKI, supra note 114, at 93 (recognizing that “state practice is often inconclusive, conﬂicting, and
ambiguous,” as “states often avoid clearly identifying the legal basis of their action” and in many cases “uncertainty
remains as to whether certain conduct amounts to retorsion or third-state countermeasures”); Martin Dawidowicz,
Third-Party Countermeasures: A Progressive Development of International Law?, 29 QUESTIONS INT’L L. ZOOM-IN 3,
14, (2016) [hereinafter Dawidowicz, Third-Party Countermeasures] (“[S]tatements expressing opinio juris in the
ﬁeld of third-party countermeasures are rare”).
116
See sources at supra note 80.
117
This interpretation is variously expressed. Some commentators propose reforms to give the rhetoric operational bite. E.g., TAMS, supra note 80, at 5 (“The present study attempts to demystify aspects of the [erga omnes]
concept and thereby to facilitate its implementation.”). Others suggest that the “problem” is that states are motivated by self-interest or that the legal system itself is too primitive. E.g., Hélène Ruiz Fabri, Enhancing the Rhetoric
of Jus Cogens, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1049, 1050 (2012) (explaining that the jus cogens principle is a source of
“hope that international law . . . can be driven by values other than the mere satisfaction of selﬁsh (albeit collective)
interests, supported and promoted by pure power relationships”); Villalpando, supra note 4, at 417 (explaining
that the “core problem” is that the legal system still lacks rules or mechanisms for balancing the interests of the
entire community against the interests of particular states).
118
E.g., Bianchi, supra note 80, at 507–08 (claiming that jus cogens has magical symbolic power); Hilary
Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, The Gender of Jus Cogens, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 63, 66 (1993) (“Much of
the importance of the jus cogens doctrine lies not in its practical application but in its symbolic signiﬁcance in
the international legal process.”); Gordon A. Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to
International Society, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 585, 590 (1988) (asserting that “jus cogens is a normative myth” that “symbolizes a hope for a humane public order” and “carries a potential vision of integrating norms basic to a cosmopolitan world order . . . ”); Petsche, supra note 93, at 237 (“[T]he true import of the recognition of the concept of
jus cogens lies more in its ‘symbolic’ value and its ‘vision’ of international law and the international legal system.”).
113
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accounts of these two principles remain underdeveloped and have not grappled with even the
most basic questions.119 For example, what message do the principles send, given that their substantive content is so nebulous? What function is served by prioritizing a small handful of norms
and thereby degrading the relative worth of so many others? How powerful of a message do the
principles convey through the discourse alone? A legal system ordinarily expresses its values not
only discursively but also—perhaps primarily—through action. If the rhetoric is unaccompanied by action, do the claims about core universal values seem empty?
The possibility remains that the principles do not do anything at all and are just “cheap
talk.”120 Realist scholars have leveled this attack against international law generally: that
global actors use it as a discursive medium because doing so is nearly costless, not because
it actually affects or is intended to affect the material world.121 The usual response to that
attack is to argue that, even if engaging with international law is cheap,122 it must do something.123 After all, it permeates global interactions, and as constructivist theorists have underscored, these interactions shape perceptions and behaviors. Yet the something that
international law is said to do is almost always described in regulatory terms. International
law helps global actors identify, implement, and enforce their shared norms.124 That explanation is inapt for jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations.125 The question is whether the
principles do something else.
119
To date, Markus Petsche has offered the most thorough expressive account of jus cogens norms. He argues
that the principle shapes, in diffuse ways, expectations about international law. Petsche’s argument rests on a claim
about the substantive content of these norms—that “jus cogens essentially aims to protect individual rights.”
Pesche, supra note 93, at 269. The argument thus does not account for the principle’s amorphous quality.
Further, it operates at a very high level of abstraction. Petsche does not explain what the jus cogens principle offers
that the substantive law—here, human rights law—does not. He also does not explain the practice of regularly
invoking the principle but not making it operational.
120
E.g., Anthony D’Amato, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, It’s Jus Cogens!, 6 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (1990) (describing
the principles as useless); Hugh W.A. Thirlway, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice—Part
One, 60 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 100 (1989) (describing them as “empty gesture[s]”).
121
E.g., JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 170–84 (2006); KENNETH
N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 200 (1979).
122
But cf. Andrew T. Guzman, The Promise of International Law, 92 VA. L. REV. 533, 561 (2006) (arguing that
using international law can actually be quite costly).
123
See Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72
U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 479 (2005) (asserting that the critics “give no explanation as to why [cheap talk] is valuable—as to why, that is, the great powers feel the need to justify the pursuit of their interests”).
124
E.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 118 (1995); JOHNSTONE, supra note 8, at 7–8, 41–50; Risse, supra
note 36, at 7 (“Argumentative and deliberative behavior is as goal oriented as strategic interaction, but the goal
is . . . to seek a reasoned consensus.”).
125
Other explanations for the international legal discourse are similarly unhelpful in this context. For example,
some scholars argue that the legal discourse helps legitimize decisions. A lawful decision might be perceived as more
legitimate and thus be easier to make than an unlawful one. E.g., Ian Hurd, The Permissive Power of the Ban on War,
EUR. J. INT’L SEC. (Aug. 9, 2016), available at http://dx.doi.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/10.1017/eis.2016.13).
This explanation presumably requires some nexus between the discourse and the decisions that it is supposed
to legitimize. No such nexus is evident here because the discourse on jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations
is disconnected from the operational practice. Other scholars claim that the discourse helps structure international
politics. These scholars do not explain what they mean by this, if not that engaging with international law regulates
behavior or is just cheap talk for politicking and debate. They also do not explore the effects of arguing in one
“language,” rather than another. See, e.g., Christian Reus-Smit, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (Christian Reus-Smit ed., 2004); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and
International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AJIL 205, 221 (1993).
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C. Contestations About Community
What they do, I argue, is help construct an international community. To do this work, the
principles need not establish meaningful rules of decision. And their substantive content need
not be settled. Indeed, it is probably best left unsettled. The principles must simply help
global actors disagree on terms that call attention to and presuppose their mutual association.
That is precisely what they do.
Consider a protracted dispute that occupied the ILC as it worked on the law on state
responsibility. In 1976, after an already extensive internal debate, the ILC proposed distinguishing between ordinary violations that states commit and so-called crimes of states.126 The
proposal was motivated by then-recent developments on jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations.127 The ILC deﬁned state crimes as violations of obligations that are “essential for the
protection of fundamental interests of the international community.”128 It reasoned that, if
an obligation protects core community values (jus cogens), and a violation affects everyone
(erga omnes), then unique consequences ought to follow under the law on state responsibility.129 The ILC’s distinction between state crimes and other international legal violations was
“[t]he single most controversial element in the Articles on State Responsibility.”130 After
twenty-ﬁve more years of debate, the ILC ﬁnally dropped the language on state crimes but
continued to claim that jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations have unique implications
for state responsibility.131
The episode is illuminating for two reasons. First, the positive law on jus cogens norms and
erga omnes obligations provoked the entire debate. When the principles were authoritatively
endorsed—in the VCLT and Barcelona Traction, respectively—they were sure to raise the
state responsibility question; by then, the ILC’s project on state responsibility had already
begun.132 Moreover, although the concept of state crimes might have been introduced even
if the principles had not yet been established in law, it is inconceivable that the ﬁght would
have been as contentious or prolonged as it was. Having that positive law gave the proponents
of state crimes the normative ammunition that they needed to press hard for their position. The
ILC’s reports and the contemporaneous secondary literature thus are replete with references to
jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations as justiﬁcations for state crimes.133
126
See Robert Ago (Special Rapporteur), Fifth Rep. on State Responsibility, UN Doc. CN.4/291 and Add.1 &
2, paras. 89–99 (1976).
127
See Marina Spinedi, International Crimes of State: The Legislative History, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF
STATE, 21–22 & 135.
128
Int’l L. Comm’n, Report on the Work of Its Twenty-Eighth Session, May 3–July 23, 1976, UN Doc. A/31/
10, at para. 61.
129
See Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles on State Responsibility with Commentaries Adopted on First Reading,
Art. 19, cmts. 10, 16–17, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.528/Add.3 [hereinafter DARSIWA Adopted on First Reading], at
http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_1996.pdf&lang=EF.
130
James Crawford (Special Rapporteur), First Rep. on State Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN.4/490, at para. 43
(1998).
131
Supra notes 94–95 and corresponding text.
132
G.A. Res. 799 (VIII), at 52 (Dec. 7, 1953); see also Bruno Simma, International Crimes: Injury and
Countermeasures. Comments on Part 2 of the ILC Work on State Responsibility, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF
STATE, supra note 106, at 283, 290 (explaining that, once the positive law existed, the state responsibility question
was “almost on the tip of the tongue”).
133
See generally DARSIWA Adopted on First Reading, supra note 129, Art. 19, cmts.; INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF
STATE, supra note 106.
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Second, the principles focused the debate on the community’s ethos:134 Who belongs to
this community?135 Who may act on its behalf to sanction speciﬁc conduct?136 Which norms
are central to its identity?137 And what is the most suitable organizing principle for protecting
those norms?138 These questions presuppose the existence of an international community
and focus the participants on deﬁning its shape and character. For decades, the questions
were at the center of an intense and prominent debate.
The answers that were batted around in this debate might have been inaccurate.
Ethical argument constructs a community not necessarily by capturing the community’s
true ethos but by putting the ethos at issue and inviting claims about its content. One
might reasonably ask about that content—for example, whether the community actually
stands for universal norms or whether all states are really members. But however we answer
those questions, the debate on state crimes clearly gave actors who otherwise have only tenuous connections to one another regular opportunities to engage with and see themselves as
134
Commentators recognized at the time that the debate on state crimes was ultimately about the international
community’s shape and character. E.g., R. Ago, Obligations Erga Omnes and the International Community, in
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATE, supra note 106, at 237, 238 (arguing that state crimes were key to the community’s “advanced institutionalization”); Eric Wyler, From ‘State Crime’ to Responsibility for ‘Serious Breaches of
Obligations Under Peremptory Norms of General International Law,’ 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1147, 1153 (2002) (claiming that state crimes were part of a transformation in the “protection of ‘international ordre public’ as a collective
interest transcending that of the victim state”).
135
E.g., Int’l L. Comm’n, State Responsibility: Comments and Observations Received from Governments,
50th Sess., May 20–June 12, July 27–Aug. 14, 1998, UN Doc. A/CN.4/488, at 121–22 [hereinafter
Government Comments] (statement of France) (“What is meant by the ‘international community’?”); Int’l
L. Comm’n, State Responsibility: Comments and Observations Received from Governments, 53rd Sess., Apr.
23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, UN Doc. A/CN.4/515, at 33, 45 (statements of United Kingdom,
Slovakia) (suggesting that “international community as a whole” be replaced by “international community of states
as a whole” to avoid confusion about the community’s composition); id. at 50 (statement of Netherlands) (supporting the use of the phrase “international community as a whole,” as opposed to “international community of
states,” in order to avoid “a restrictive interpretation of the term ‘international community’”).
136
E.g., Government Comments, supra note 135, at 122 (statement of France) (“[W]ho will determine that an
interest is ‘fundamental’ and that it is of concern to the ‘international community’ . . . ?”); id. at 114 (statement of
Austria) (“[I]nter-State relations lack the kind of central authority necessary to decide on subjective aspects of
wrongful State behavior.”); id. at 119 (statement of Mongolia) (“[T]he determination of the commission of an
international crime [must] not be left to the decision of one State, but be attributed to the competence of international judicial bodies.”) (alteration in original); id. at 121 (U.S. statement) (“Existing international institutions
and regimes already contain a system of law for responding to violations of international obligations which the
Commission might term ‘crimes.’”).
137
E.g., DARSIWA Adopted on First Reading, supra note 129, Art. 19(3) & Art. 19, cmt. 62 (providing a nonexhaustive list of possible crimes and explaining that the category of crimes overlaps considerably but not entirely
with that of jus cogens norms); Alain Pellet, Can a State Commit a Crime? Deﬁnitely, Yes!, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 425,
428–29 (1999) (arguing that international crimes should include all breaches of jus cogens norms but not all
breaches of erga omnes obligations).
138
See James Crawford (Special Rapporteur), First Rep. on State Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN.4/490, at 13–14
(1998) (“Many [government] comments accept that a distinction should be drawn . . . between the most serious
wrongful acts, of interest to the international community as a whole, and wrongful acts which are of concern only
to the directly affected States. But the distinction need not and perhaps should not be expressed in the language of
‘crime’ and ‘delict.’”); Government Comments, supra note 135, at 120 (U.K. statement) (“[I]t is entirely possible
that the concept [of state crimes] would impede, rather than facilitate, the condemnation of egregious breaches of
the law . . . [and] make it more difﬁcult for the international community to frame the terms of the condemnation so
as to match precisely the particular circumstances of each case of wrongdoing.”); B. Graefrath, On the Reaction of
the “International Community as a Whole”: A Perspective of Survival, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATES, supra
note 106, at 254 (“[T]here is a common understanding that there are violations of international obligations
that are so dangerous that the community as such, as a whole, should react; the international community should
have the possibility, the means to react because this is necessary for the survival of mankind. . . .”).
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part of a common enterprise. The reason that the debate became so heated is that many of
these participants care deeply about the enterprise. They want the international community
to stand for some things (e.g., peace and human rights) and not others (e.g., aggression or state
impunity). The principles allowed them to battle over the core tenets of their association
without calling into question—indeed while reinforcing—that they are an association.
The debate on state crimes was not aberrational. Because jus cogens norms and erga omnes
obligations expressly invoke an international community, they regularly fuel ethical argument.
The ICJ’s recent Jurisdictional Immunities case is another high-proﬁle example.139 The case
arose out of a suit against Germany in Italian court for claims of forced deportation and labor
during World War II. In Ferrini v. Germany, Italy’s highest court relied heavily on the jus
cogens concept to override Germany’s immunity and allow the case to proceed.140 Ferrini
explained that the claims against Germany rested on norms that “lie at the heart of the international order and prevail over all other conventional and customary norms . . . .”141 Ferrini
then echoed the debate on state crimes, asserting that immunity would be inappropriate for
“such grave violations” because these violations require “a response which, in qualitative terms,
is different and more severe than that reserved for other illegal acts.”142
Here again, the jus cogens principle enabled a set of conﬂicts. If Ferrini had upheld
Germany’s immunity, the dispute probably would have dissipated; the Italian claimant lacked
a good alternative outlet. By stripping Germany of immunity, Ferrini instead allowed the dispute to proceed. Ferrini also catalyzed several other lawsuits or enforcement proceedings
against Germany in Italian court for conduct relating to World War II.143 Eventually,
Germany’s discontent with these developments led it to initiate a case against Italy at the
ICJ.144 Greece then intervened in that case.145 (A group of Greek nationals had separately
been seeking redress against Germany for similar conduct.) The sparring did not end with
the ICJ’s 2012 judgment. In 2014, Italy’s Constitutional Court declined to follow the ICJ
and held that Italian courts have jurisdiction over foreign states for claims relating to gross
violations of fundamental rights on Italian territory.146 Since then, lower Italian courts
have issued a number of rulings against Germany for World War II–era conduct.147
These disputes are plainly about more than the rules on immunity or the relief that is due to
particular claimants. They are about the central contest in international law over the past several decades: the extent to which states’ traditional prerogatives trump the interests of
139

Germany v. Italy, supra note 92.
Ferrini v. Fed. Repub. Germany, 128 ILR 659 (Ital. Corte di Cassazione 2004).
141
Id., para. 9.
142
Id.
143
See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.; Greece intervening), Germany, Memorial, paras. 23–
45 (June 12, 2009) (discussing subsequent cases) [hereinafter Germany v. Italy, Germany Memorial].
144
Application of Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. Italy), (Dec. 23, 2008).
145
Application by Greece to Intervene in Case Concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.),
(Jan. 13, 2011).
146
Judgment 238, Corte Cost., 22 Oct. 2014, Foro it. 2015, I, 1152 (It.), available at https://drive.google.com/
ﬁle/d/0BwJjW6kOLfgiX1BWRlpQVTZxb28/view?usp=sharing.
147
See Paolo de Stefani, On Human Dignity and State Sovereignty: The Italian Constitutional Court’s 238/2014
Judgment on State Immunity, at 5 (Feb. 19, 2016) (working paper), available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/295103806.
140
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individuals.148 The ICJ proceedings thus are dripping with ethical argument.149 Greece’s
intervening statement is particularly colorful; it proclaims that granting Germany immunity
in the case would “jeopardize all of the progress made within the international community.”150 Skeptics might dismiss this talk as cheap or pretextual. Greece surely spoke in ethical
terms to advance what it believed to be its self-interest. But that does not render its argument
meaningless or irrelevant. Even if Greece used ethical argument cynically, it did so in order to
engage with the international legal project and because it believed—correctly—that ethical
argument would resonate with key players on the international stage.
The alternative to having these disputes is not a more uniﬁed community. Global actors
disagree sharply on the proper balance between state and individual interests. The alternative
is to have a lesser community, one in which fewer actors have reason to interact on, or to see or
treat themselves as part of, a common project. In the context of jus cogens norms and erga
omnes obligations, that project concerns the basic foundations of the legal order.
IV. ETHICAL ARGUMENT IN THE MAINSTREAM
The ethical arguments about jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations are easy to spot
because they expressly speak of community. But ethical argument in international law is not
limited to those two principles. Usually, it appears without explicit reference to community,
and it works to construct not an all-inclusive community but communities that organize
around speciﬁc issues. Such communities are known to exist. International law consists of
a patchwork of regulatory arrangements. Participants in any given arrangement comprise
an international community to the extent that they engage together on and act like they
are part of a shared governance project.
To show that ethical legal conﬂict helps constitute these communities, I use as an example
the community that centers at the WTO. I focus on this community for two reasons. First,
scholars widely recognize that it is, at least at its core, a tight-knit group. The WTO “club” or
“insider network” consists of actors who regularly interact on the trade project—national
trade ofﬁcials, international civil servants, academics, and private sector attorneys and consultants.151 WTO adjudicators are also key players in this community. Other actors participate
more indirectly, episodically, or at the margins.
Second, I use the WTO community because it is, in many respects, the poster child for the
view that I resist. The WTO’s success is usually attributed to the members’ shared precepts—
their common policy objectives, rules, and practices—and to their mechanisms for curbing

On this contest’s centrality, see RUTI G. TEITEL, HUMANITY’S LAW 9, 37 (2011); W. Michael Reisman,
Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AJIL 866, 872 (1990).
149
E.g., Germany v. Italy, supra note 92, paras. 288–99 (separate opinion by Trinidade, J.); Jurisdictional
Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.; Greece intervening), Counter-Memorial of Italy, paras. 4.56–.77 (Dec.
22, 2009); Germany v. Italy, Germany Memorial, supra note 143, paras. 83–90.
150
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.; Greece intervening), Written Statement of Hellenic
Republic, para. 56 (Aug. 3, 2011), at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ﬁles/143/16658.pdf#view=
FitH&pagemode=none&search=%22diplomatic%22.
151
E.g., Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy—and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading
Regime, 96 AJIL 94, 98 (2002); Richard B. Stewart & Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, The World Trade
Organization: Multiple Dimensions of Global Administrative Law, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 556, 560 (2011).
148
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disputes.152 I show that that view is incomplete. Although the participants in the WTO have
plenty in common, they also have profound and intractable differences. In the face of this
internal division, WTO law constitutes and fortiﬁes the group in part by enabling ethical
conﬂict—establishing the ground rules for the participants to disagree about the tenets of
their association while reinforcing that they are in it together. I examine below two kinds
of ethical conﬂict that are routine at the WTO: (1) conﬂicts about the trade agenda, and
(2) conﬂicts about the terms of membership in this community.
A. Agenda Conﬂicts
The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations that culminated with the WTO agreements in
1994 signiﬁcantly expanded the trade project.153 The effect was to magnify what Robert
Howse has called the “core dilemma” in trade governance—the fact that trade liberalization
is in tension with “a rather huge number of possible nontrade or not explicitly trade-based
policies” that individual states might legitimately pursue.154 This dilemma goes to heart of the
WTO. It raises the question of what the trade agenda is all about: To what extent and when
should the policy on liberalization bend to accommodate other social or economic interests?
Disagreements about that question are a persistent and largely intractable feature of the
WTO.155
The WTO Appellate Body has responded not by trying to resolve the contest but by
enabling states continually to have it. In WTO law, the question presented is usually whether
a trade-restrictive measure falls within one of the recognized “public interest” exceptions to
liberalization.156 A series of decisions predating the WTO interpreted those exceptions narrowly, prioritizing liberalization over states’ autonomy to pursue other regulatory goals, like
protecting human health or the environment.157 As discontent with that approach grew, the
WTO Appellate Body shifted gears. It started affording states more discretion to restrict trade
152
See, e.g., Andrew Lang & Joanne Scott, The Hidden World of WTO Governance, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 575, 604
(2009) (asserting that the WTO has helped create “a relatively close-knit community of trade negotiators and
governmental ofﬁcials with a deﬁned ‘ethos,’ a sense of common purpose, broadly shared normative commitments, and common ways of deﬁning and analysing problems,” and suggesting that “this community is sustained[ as] its shared ideas are created and disseminated”); Posner & Sykes, supra note 12, at 1033–34 (“The
WTO dispute settlement system helps to orchestrate cooperation. . . . [It] has the capacity to resolve disputes
over the meaning of the rules, so that disagreements over ambiguous legal obligations do not degenerate into
trade wars.”).
153
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 UNTS 14.
154
Howse, supra note 151, at 95; see also, e.g., ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER NEOLIBERALISM 57–58
(2011) (arguing that trade law’s ideological foundations are contested).
155
For an excellent overview of this contest within the WTO, see Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization
20 Years On: Global Governance by Judiciary, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9 (2016) [hereinafter Howse, The WTO 20 Years
On].
156
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Art. XX, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 UNTS 187; General Agreement on Trade in Services, Art. XIV, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 UNTS 183.
157
E.g., Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991), GATT
BISD (39th Supp.), at 50–51 (1991) (environment); Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, DS29/R, paras. 5.27, 5.39, 6.1 (Jun. 16, 1994) (same); Report of the Panel, Thailand—Restrictions on
Importation of and International Taxes on Cigarettes, paras. 72–76, DS10/R (Nov. 7, 1990), GATT BISD
(37th Supp.), at 200 (1990) (health); Report of the Panel, Canada—Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed
Herring and Salmon, L/6268 (Mar. 22, 1988), GATT BISD (35th Supp.), at 114 (1989) (environment).
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for other interests.158 However, the Appellate Body has not in any meaningful sense resettled
or established new rules of decision in this area. Its test for assessing measures that are justiﬁed
in the public interest is opaque, shifty, and fact-speciﬁc.159 What the Appellate Body has done
is create space for states to use WTO law to ﬁght about the proper balance between liberalization and other interests in concrete settings. This balance is unstable and consistently at
issue in WTO legal disputes.
The 2014 decision in EC-Seal Products is illustrative.160 Canada and Norway contested a
European Union regulation that prohibited the importation and sale of products containing
seal, with exceptions for seals hunted by indigenous communities or for marine management.
The case was widely understood to be about more than the particular regulation at issue; it
was about the kind of community that the WTO would be—the extent to which this community would permit states to restrict trade in order to advance their idiosyncratic policy preferences.161 The Appellate Body decided that trade restrictions for animal welfare can fall
within the public morals exception to liberalization.162 It then found that the particular regulation at issue was noncompliant because the exception for indigenous hunts was arbitrary.163 Trade scholars have criticized the decision for its muddy reasoning, departures
from precedent, and failure to guide states on the larger ethical contest that the case
presented.164
158

See Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp & Shrimp Products,
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, paras. 153–54, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/RW (adopted
Nov. 21, 2001); Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp & Shrimp
Products, para. 121, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Nov. 6, 1998); Diane A. Desierto, Public Policy in
International Investment and Trade Law: Community Expectations and Functional Decision-Making, 26 FLA. J. INT’L
L. 51, 70–71 (2014) (“Despite some well-known victories . . . full acceptance of States’ regulatory freedom to enact
policies that vindicate public interest or human rights concerns remains very much a work-in-progress throughout
the WTO system.” (footnotes omitted)).
159
See, e.g., Lorand Bartels, The Chapeau of the General Exceptions in the WTO GATT and GATS Agreements: A
Reconstruction, 109 AJIL 95, 96 (2015) (explaining that trade measures have repeatedly been deemed noncompliant for failing to satisfy the chapeau of the provision with the public interest exceptions but that “it is still not
clear what [the chapeau] requires”); Andrew D. Mitchell & Caroline Henckels, Variations on a Theme: Comparing
the Concept of “Necessity” in International Investment Law and WTO Law, 14 CHI. J. INT’L L. 93, 155 (2013)
(reviewing cases and concluding that “[t]he test has been expressed in a number of different ways and indeed
seems to change each time it is articulated . . .”).
160
Appellate Body Reports, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of
Seal Products, WTO Docs. WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R (adopted June 18, 2014) [hereinafter Seal
Products].
161
See, e.g., Robert Howse & Joanna Langille, Permitting Pluralism: The Seal Products Dispute and Why the
WTO Should Accept Trade Restrictions Justiﬁed by Noninstrumental Moral Values, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 367, 430
(2012) (suggesting that the case is about whether, “by permitting pluralism, the WTO fulﬁlls its own institutional
mandate more effectively and does not unnecessarily encroach on the regulatory autonomy of member states”);
Julia Y. Qin, Accommodating Divergent Policy Objectives Under WTO Law: Reﬂections on EC—Seal Products, AJIL
UNBOUND (June 25, 2015, 11:42 AM), at http://www.asil.org/blogs/accommodating-divergent-policy-objectivesunder-wto-law-reﬂections-ec%E2%80%94seal-products (claiming that the case is about how WTO law would
“accommodate divergent legitimate purposes of domestic regulation”).
162
Seal Products, supra note 160, paras. 5.194–5.201.
163
Id., paras. 5.338–.339.
164
E.g., Gregory Shaffer & David Pabian, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation
and Marketing of Seal Products, 109 AJIL 154, 158–59 (2015); Donald H. Regan, Measures with Multiple
Purposes: Puzzles from EC–Seal Products, AJIL UNBOUND (June 25, 2015, 11:41 AM), at https://www.asil.org/
blogs/measures-multiple-purposes-puzzles-ec%E2%80%94seal-products; Joel Trachtman, The WTO Seal
Products Case: Doctrinal and Normative Confusion, AJIL UNBOUND (June 25, 2015, 11:38 AM), at https://
www.asil.org/blogs/wto-seal-products-case-doctrinal-and-normative-confusion; Qin, supra note 161. But cf.
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But leaving this area of law pliable allows states to continue arguing through it. Here,
WTO law brings states together to ﬁght about their trade agenda on terms that reinforce
that this is where trade governance happens. Again, the alternative to having these conﬂicts
is not more unity on trade policy. WTO members invariably disagree on precisely when and
how the policy on liberalization intersects with other interests. The most plausible alternative
is for the community to be less integrated—for members that disagree with one another or
with particular WTO policies to disengage from the enterprise. For example, some members
might just accept the policies that others prescribe, without themselves expending the energy
to crystallize or ﬁght for their preferences. Others might try to undercut the WTO by shifting
decisionmaking to arenas that they ﬁnd more favorable. Still others might just disregard
WTO rules with which they disagree or refuse to participate in WTO processes when they
are unlikely to prevail. Playing out their conﬂicts through WTO law keeps them engaged in
the governance project and has the effect of strengthening, not weakening, the association.
B. Membership Conﬂicts
The WTO community is also beset by disagreements about its composition and terms of
membership. I use “membership” here in a functional, rather than a technical, sense—to
mean not just states, which the WTO agreements formally recognize as members, but the
full set of actors who engage with the WTO. Questions about the participation or role of
speciﬁc actors regularly arise and are contested at the WTO.165 The disputes are ethical
because they go to the community’s constitutional makeup.
For example, the participation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) received considerable attention in the 1990s and early 2000s.166 NGOs were becoming more aware of the
WTO and interested in shaping trade policy. The initial response from within the WTO was
meager. The General Council, which consists of all WTO member states, decided to give
NGOs new opportunities to interact with and learn about the WTO, while keeping them
at the periphery of WTO decisionmaking.167 The council proclaimed that “there is currently
Robert Howse, Joanna Langille & Katie Sykes, Pluralism in Practice: Moral Legislation and the Law of the WTO
After Seal Products, 48 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 81, 149 (2015) (arguing that, though the Appellate Body ideally
would not have “sacriﬁce[d] clarity,” its decision “was ultimately not as problematic” as others say because it “was
generally rooted in an appropriate and subtle understanding of the WTO’s institutional role”).
165
I focus in the main text on the participation of nongovernmental organizations. Other membership conﬂicts
in the WTO have concerned: (1) the participation of particular states, (2) the dominance of an insider group in
decisionmaking, (3) the limited opportunities for direct stakeholder involvement, (4) the apparent disenfranchisement of developing countries, and (5) the role or inﬂuence of other intergovernmental bodies. For tastes of these
other conﬂicts, see YVES BONZON, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND LEGITIMACY IN THE WTO (2014); SARAH JOSEPH,
BLAME IT ON THE WTO? 56–90 (2011); Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China’s WTO Accession
Saga, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1469 (2000); Gregory Shaffer & Joel Trachtman, Interpretation and
Institutional Choice at the WTO, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 103, 127–35 (2011); Stewart & Badin, supra note 151.
166
See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Opening the WTO to Nongovernmental Interests, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 173
(2000); Philip M. Nichols, Realism, Liberalism, Values, and the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L
ECON. L. 851 (1996); Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge: Democracy and the
Law and Politics of the WTO’s Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 61–
68 (2001).
167
See WTO General Council, Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations,
WTO Doc. WT/L/162 (July 23, 1996) [hereinafter NGO Guidelines]; see also Robert Howse, Membership and Its
Privileges: The WTO, Civil Society, and the Amicus Brief Controversy, 9 EUR. L.J. 496, 497 (2003) [hereinafter
Howse, Membership and Its Privileges] (explaining that these opportunities were marginal and intentionally disconnected from the hub of WTO decisionmaking).
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a broadly held view that it would not be possible for NGOs to be directly involved in the work
of the WTO or its meetings.”168 Shortly thereafter, the WTO Appellate Body decided, with
highly legalistic interpretations of the relevant treaty, that WTO adjudicative bodies may consider amicus curiae briefs that NGOs submit.169
The Appellate Body’s legal decisions on amicus briefs provoked an intense ethical conﬂict.170 The dispute came to a head in November 2000, when the Appellate Body took
the initiative to establish “working procedures” for the submission of amicus briefs in a
case that was then pending before it.171 States responded loudly and negatively. They convened a special General Council meeting, and almost every state that spoke criticized the
Appellate Body’s working procedures.172 Developing countries were especially vocal; their
principal complaints went directly to the membership’s composition and terms of
participation.
Uruguay’s comments are representative. It claimed that the Appellate Body’s working procedures improperly “affected the rights and obligations of WTO Members and altered the
relationship between the bodies within the system.”173 Uruguay’s worries were twofold.
First, the Appellate Body arrogated for itself “decisions on relations with NGOs while
such decisions statutorily belonged to the General Council.”174 Second, the Appellate
Body effectively “grant[ed] individuals and institutions outside of the WTO a right that
Members themselves did not possess.”175 Egypt, speaking on behalf of the Informal
Group of Developing Countries, echoed those concerns, underscoring that “[t]he WTO
was a Member-driven”—by which it meant state-driven—“organization and this basic fundamental nature of the organization had to, and would, remain as such.”176 India proclaimed
that “the effect of the Appellate Body’s approach to amicus curiae briefs was to strike at the
intergovernmental nature of the WTO.”177 As these comments reveal, the dispute was as contentious as it was not because amicus briefs are so important but because it put at issue a question that went to the core of the community’s ethos: Would this community remain insular

168

NGO Guidelines, supra note 167, para. VI.
See Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp & Shrimp Products, paras.
106–10, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Nov. 6, 1998) (deciding that WTO panels may consider unsolicited NGO amicus briefs); Appellate Body Report, United States–Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain
Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, paras. 39–42, WTO Doc.
WT/DS138/AB/R (adopted June 7, 2000) (deciding that the Appellate Body has this authority).
170
A similar conﬂict about amicus briefs has recently been playing out in international investment law. For an
overview, see Katia Fach Gómez, LLM Perspective, Rethinking the Role of Amicus Curiae in International
Investment Arbitration: How to Draw the Line Favorably for the Public Interest, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 510 (2012).
171
Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing
Products, paras. 50–52, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2001).
172
See WTO Gen. Council, Minutes of Meeting of Nov. 22, 2000 (Jan. 23, 2001), at https://docsonline.wto.
org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/DirectDoc.aspx?ﬁlename=t%3A%2Fwt%2Fgc%2Fm60.doc&.
173
Id., para. 5.
174
Id., para. 6; see also, e.g., id. at 50 (Mexican statement that the Appellate Body “arrogated to itself a right that
belonged solely to WTO members acting collectively”); id., para. 55 (Colombian statement on behalf of the
ANDEAN members that “[t]he power to create a procedure such as the one proposed rested exclusively with
Members”); id., para. 57 (Zimbabwean statement that the Appellate Body “usurped Members’ authority”).
175
Id., para. 7.
176
Id., para. 16.
177
Id., para. 38.
169
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and controlled mostly by states, or would it integrate other actors and allocate more authority
to its adjudicative bodies?178
In the end, the brouhaha over amicus briefs ﬁzzled without substantive resolution. The
Appellate Body decided that none of the nonparty briefs in the case before it satisﬁed its working procedures.179 Since then, WTO adjudicative bodies have continued to accept amicus
briefs on a case-by-case basis but have generally treated these briefs as tangential to their decisions.180 Meanwhile, NGOs have identiﬁed other ways to engage with the WTO,181 though
the terms of their participation remain ﬂuid and contestable.182 Perhaps for these reasons,
commentators have said that the amicus dispute “produced little more than frustration”183
or was “much ado about nothing.”184
Those assessments overlook the role of ethical conﬂict in constructing a community. The
amicus dispute not only presupposed that the community existed but also treated it as worth
ﬁghting for—as if belonging and exercising authority in it mattered. The dispute was particularly signiﬁcant because it gave developing countries, which historically have been marginalized at the WTO,185 an opportunity to reafﬁrm their stake in it and claim it as their own.
Again, the alternative was not more unity or consensus. It was for one WTO organ to try to
settle the issue, with the effect of further alienating an important constituency—either developing countries or the NGOs and their supporters. The Appellate Body’s legal decisions on
amicus briefs incited an ethical conﬂict that, though never really resolved, reinforced the community’s standing as the locus of trade governance.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE
I have argued that conﬂict—especially conﬂict that plays out in ethical legal terms—can be
productive for an international community. It can help constitute and fortify the community.
My argument so far has been descriptive and analytic, but its prescriptive message is clear.
Insofar as we favor and want to support particular governance arrangements, we ought to
178
On the point that this dispute was about much more than the amicus briefs, see J. H. H. Weiler, The Rule of
Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reﬂections on WTO Dispute Settlement, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY:
THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 334, 344 (Roger B. Porter, Pierre Suavé, Arvind
Subramanian & Americo Beviglia Zampetti eds., 2001); Howse, Membership and Its Privileges, supra note 167,
at 509.
179
See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing
Products, paras. 55–56, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2001).
180
See Eric De Brabandere, NGOs and the “Public Interest”: The Legality and Rationale of Amicus Curiae
Interventions in International Economic and Investment Disputes, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 85, 87, 110 (2011).
181
See Seema Sapra, The WTO System of Trade Governance: The Stale NGO Debate and the Appropriate Role for
Non-state Actors, 11 OR. REV. INT’L L. 71, 90–95 (2009). But cf. Peter Van den Bossche, NGO Involvement in the
WTO: A Comparative Perspective, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 717, 747 (2008) (arguing that NGO participation is still
low).
182
See BONZON, supra note 165, at 1–7.
183
Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Public Participation in the Trade Regime: Of Litigation, Frustration, Agitation, and
Legitimation, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 961, 965 (2004).
184
Petros C. Mavroidis, Amicus Curiae Briefs Before the WTO: Much Ado About Nothing, in EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL CO-ORDINATION 317 (Armin von Bogdandy, Peter C. Mavroidis & Yves
Mény eds., 2002).
185
See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, para. 3, WTO Doc. WT/
MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002) (pledging to “address[] the marginalization of least-developed countries in
international trade and to improv[e] their effective participation in the multilateral trading system”).
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preserve or create space for ethical conﬂict. We ought to ensure that the relevant participants
(however deﬁned) have opportunities to ﬁght on terms that reinforce their association. That
message runs counter to much of the current thinking on international law. Many analysts
assume that an international community is constituted by commonality and corroded by
internal divisions or discord. And they press for international law to solidify consensus and
deter or curb disputes. My argument suggests that we need to alter that thinking. Below, I
discuss what this might mean in speciﬁc contexts. To be clear, my goal here is not to offer
concrete proposals for reform. It is to explain why and how we might reassess some common
tropes in the design and practice of international law.
A. Doctrinal Design
Several foundational rules of international law are justiﬁed on the ground that, by simply
reducing interstate friction, they foster friendly relations and enhance global stability. That
logic is ﬂawed. Friction is not inherently an impediment to—and is often an ingredient for—
friendly and stable relationships. So, we should stop treating this justiﬁcation as if it is persuasive on its face. We should demand additional support for it in discrete contexts, defend
the relevant rules on other grounds, or adopt different rules.
Take the rule on foreign state immunity that was at issue in the Jurisdictional Immunities
case. The most prominent justiﬁcations for this rule are that it: (1) respects state sovereignty,
and (2) enhances interstate relations by reducing friction.186 The ﬁrst justiﬁcation has never
been sufﬁcient to explain why a foreign state’s prerogatives trump the host state’s, especially if
the host is regulating conduct in its own territory.187 The sovereignty justiﬁcation has also
become less tenable over time. In contemporary international law, sovereignty is no longer an
adequate basis for shielding states from accountability. Thus, the second justiﬁcation—about
reducing interstate friction—is doing much of the heavy lifting. For example, Steven Ratner
recently proclaimed that the rule on foreign state immunity “can easily be justiﬁed for its contribution to peace, for the complete absence of immunity would inﬂame interstate tensions.”188 The assumption here is that friction necessarily impairs and destabilizes
interstate relations.
It does not. What matters is not whether exercising jurisdiction produces friction but how
that friction manifests and affects the frequency or nature of the interactions. Indeed, the idea
that exercising jurisdiction necessarily corrodes global relationships is belied by a wellaccepted exception to immunity. Under the so-called restrictive theory of immunity that
most states now endorse, national courts may exercise jurisdiction over foreign states for
claims relating to commercial conduct.189 This exception invariably produces friction in
the form of domestic litigation. But there is little evidence that it destabilizes—and good
186
E.g., The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812) (justifying immunity by
the “perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and [the] common interest impelling them to
mutual intercourse, and an interchange of good ofﬁces with each other”); Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity,
Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 AJIL 741, 748 (2003) (describing
these justiﬁcations as the “two leading rationales . . . [for] the doctrine”).
187
See id. at 748–55.
188
RATNER, supra note 1, at 203.
189
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 100–01 (2d ed. 2005); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW
512–16 (7th ed. 2014).
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reason to believe that it instead enhances—global relations. Allowing courts to adjudicate
commercial claims lessens the pressure on the host state’s political branches to get involved
in these disputes.190 The litigation helps keep the conﬂicts conﬁned to the actual disputants.
It probably also helps deepen commercial ties between countries. Private entities are more
likely to do serious business with a foreign state if they are conﬁdent that they can hold it
liable for its misconduct than if they are not.191 In short, the rule on foreign state immunity
needs a more rigorous justiﬁcation.
So too does the rule that limits countermeasures to states that are uniquely injured by a
breach. An oft-stated reason for this rule is that allowing “third” states to take countermeasures “would certainly cause a very disturbing increase in international tension”192 or even
devolve the global order into chaos.193 Again, that reasoning is suspect. Expanding the
right to take countermeasures might inﬂame interstate tensions and exacerbate disputes.
But it would do so by enabling multiple states to engage seriously and simultaneously on
an issue—which is part of how broad-based multilateral relationships are sustained.194 For
example, since 2011, more than a dozen countries have imposed countermeasures and
other economic restrictions on the Syrian government for atrocities in the Syrian civil
war.195 The remedial or deterrent effect of third-state countermeasures tends to negligible.196
The measures are signiﬁcant because they are an occasion for multiple states to rally behind
the violated norms and to insist that these norms apply equally to all states. The rule that
limits countermeasures to uniquely injured states should be relaxed or justiﬁed on other
grounds. And if it is maintained, we ought to appreciate its potential costs. At times, it likely
will deprive states of opportunities to engage together on their shared governance project and
deepen their association.

See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 45 (1976) (explaining that the “broad purposes” of the U.S. Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act were “to facilitate and depoliticize litigation against foreign states and to minimize irritations in foreign relations arising out of such litigation . . .”); H. Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional
Immunities of Foreign States, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 220, 240 (1951) (“From the point of view of securing a friendly
atmosphere in international relations judicial remedies against foreign states may be preferable to diplomatic action
necessitated by the refusal of those states to submit to jurisdiction.”).
191
Cf. Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the
Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 80
(1976) (testimony of Cecil J. Olmstead, Chairman, Rule of Law Comm. and Vice President, Texaco Co., accompanied by Timothy Atkeson, Counsel) (“Enactment of this bill[] . . . should substantially reduce certain risks of
doing business with foreign governmental entities, reduce costly litigation over immunity issues, and thus beneﬁt
the American business community as a whole.”).
192
Michael Akehurst, Reprisals by Third States, 44 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 15–16 (1970).
193
Stephen C. McCaffrey, Lex Lata or the Continuum of State Responsibility, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF
STATE, supra note 106, at 242, 244 (“It would seem that any situation allowing each member of the international
community to take individual action would amount to a state of vigilantism, and thus simply be an invitation to
chaos.”); Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AJIL 413, 433 (1983) (“[U]nder
the banner of law, chaos and violence would come to reign. . . .”); see also, e.g., D.N. Hutchinson, Solidarity and
Breaches of Multilateral Treaties, 59 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 151, 202 (1988) (“To leave each State to determine its own
right to respond to an international crime might, therefore, let loose ‘a sort of international vigilantism . . . .’”
(footnote omitted)).
194
For examples of countermeasures or other unfriendly measures strengthening legal relationships, see Monica
Hakimi, Unfriendly Unilateralism, 55 HARV. INT’L L.J. 105, 126–38 (2014).
195
Dawidowicz, Third-Party Countermeasures, supra note 115, at 6–7.
196
See TAMS, supra note 80, at 229 (reviewing the state practice on such countermeasures and concluding that
“[t]heir actual effects were often rather trivial”).
190
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B. Institutional Design
1. Adjudicative Institutions. Recognizing that conﬂict can be productive for a community
should also affect how we assess key international institutions. In recent decades, international
courts, tribunals, and other adjudicative bodies have ﬂourished. Adjudicative institutions are
generally thought to enhance global governance arrangements by helping to resolve concrete
disputes and clarify the law’s normative content, either generally or as applied in speciﬁc
cases.197 My argument suggests that these institutions can also enhance global governance
arrangements by enabling protracted conﬂicts.
The suggestion is not as radical as it might appear because it actually captures quite a bit of
practice. Recall that the WTO Appellate Body created space in WTO law for states to ﬁght
about the proper balance between liberalization and other regulatory goals.198 Here, an adjudicative institution unsettled, rather than clariﬁed, the law’s normative content. And while WTO
adjudications can help resolve concrete disputes, they often also catalyze additional rounds of
battle. Many WTO disputes last years after an initial ﬁnding of noncompliance, as losing states
make only modest adjustments to or refuse to alter their offending regulations.199 Such tactics
are facilitated, not hampered, by the adjudicative process. The fact-speciﬁcity of WTO decisions
and the availability of countermeasures to remedy only prospective harms give noncompliant
states leeway to keep ﬁghting for their positions, rather than accept the unfavorable rulings and
work earnestly toward compliance.200 Thus, even if WTO adjudication eventually leads to a
dispute’s resolution, it often ﬁrst serves to structure an extended conﬂict.
Indeed, adjudicative bodies sometimes make explicit that they intend neither to settle a
concrete dispute nor to clarify the law. The ICJ’s judgment in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros is an
example.201 The case arose out of a 1977 treaty between Hungary and Czechoslovakia
about the joint construction of various installations along the Danube River. (When
Czechoslovakia dissolved, Slovakia inherited the case.) The ICJ found that each party had
acted unlawfully.202 It then addressed the question of what the parties must do going forward.
The Court acknowledged that the treaty’s “literal application” was no longer feasible,203 but
rather than give the treaty new content, it directed the parties to deﬁne that content themselves.204 The dispute still lacks a substantive resolution.205
197
See, e.g., KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (2014); YUVAL SHANY, ASSESSING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 48 (2014). The idea that adjudicative institutions exist to resolve disputes is evident even in the language that is most often used to describe them—as “dispute settlement” bodies.
198
See supra Part IV.A.
199
See Joost Pauwelyn, The WTO 20 Years On: ‘Global Governance by Judiciary’ or, Rather, Member-Driven
Settlement of (Some) Trade Disputes Between (Some) WTO Members?, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming) (manuscript
at 4), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2864413.
200
See Howse, The WTO 20 Years On, supra note 155, at 19 (explaining that because “remedies are only prospective,” there is in effect “a ‘free ride’ to violate WTO obligations for several years, given the length of time the
dispute process takes”).
201
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 ICJ REP. 7 (Sept. 25).
202
Id., paras. 59, 77, 87–88.
203
Id., para. 142.
204
Id., para. 141 (“[I]t is not for the Court . . . [but] for the Parties themselves to ﬁnd an agreed solution that
takes account of the objectives of the Treaty, which must be pursued in a joint and integrated way. . . .”).
205
See Jana Liptáková, State Takes Control of Gabcíkovo, SLOVAK SPECTATOR (Mar. 23, 2015), at http://spectator.
sme.sk/c/20056626/state-takes-control-of-gabcikovo.html.
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Analysts of course know that international courts and tribunals do not always resolve the
disputes before them or clarify the law’s normative content. But most interpret this practice as
evidence of dysfunction—that the institutions are weak, ﬂawed, or ineffective.206 My claim is
that the practice can be productive. There is value to enabling global actors to ﬁght about the
tenets of their governance project, even when they cannot agree on its content. Adjudicative
bodies are especially suited to teeing up and sharpening these disputes because adjudication
spurs each side to defend its position as forcefully as possible, on terms that assume an existing
relationship.207
2. Institutional Redundancy. For similar reasons, we might see upsides to international
law’s institutional redundancy. Recall that the various communities that use international
law operate mostly independently from one another. Each has its own governance project
and institutional structure. But these communities inevitably overlap and intersect.
Multiple studies show that global actors exploit that institutional redundancy to undercut
decisions with which they disagree. Those who dislike a decision by one community often
work to obtain a competing and more favorable decision within another. In other words,
they purposefully create conﬂicts between communities.208
The extended dispute over the regulation of genetically modiﬁed organisms (GMOs) is a
well-known example.209 Under the WTO agreements, health or environmental restrictions
on food imports must satisfy a “sound science” requirement: any restriction that
exceeds international standards must be based on a scientiﬁc risk assessment and “not
206
See sources at supra note 164 (criticizing WTO Appellate Body decision in Seal Products); Laurence
R. Helfer, The Effectiveness of International Adjudicators, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
ADJUDICATION 464–70 (Cesare P.R. Romano, Karen J. Alter & Yuval Shany eds., 2014) (reviewing literature
and explaining that the efﬁcacy of these bodies is almost always assessed in terms of whether they actually resolve
disputes or clarify the law); Phoebe N. Okowa, Case Concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/
Slovakia), 47 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 688, 697 (1998) (characterizing the judgment as an abdication of judicial
responsibility); Gregory Shaffer, Manfred Elsig & Sergio Puig, The Extensive (but Fragile) Authority of the
WTO Appellate Body, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., 237, 269–70 (2016) (“Another, even more troubling tactic to
avoid the WTO’s impact is ‘uncompliance,’ in which a Member formally complies with a ruling but adopts
other measures that have an equivalent protectionist effect that nulliﬁes the ruling’s impact.” (emphasis added)).
207
Cf. Weiler, supra note 178, at 339 (“[D]isputes that go to adjudication are not settled; they are won and
lost.”).
208
E.g., DIRK PULKOWSKI, THE LAW AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL REGIME CONFLICT 191 (2014) (“The
simultaneous coverage of one and the same situation by the rules of various regimes—and thus the potential
for their conﬂict—is the intentional product of political bargaining.”); SURABHI RANGANATHAN, STRATEGICALLY
CREATED TREATY CONFLICTS AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 6–7 (2014) (describing the practice of creating new treaties to undercut or challenge existing treaties); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs
Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 53–62
(2004) [hereinafter Helfer, Regime Shifting] (arguing that developing countries use “regime shifting” to, among
other things, try to “revise or supplement existing intellectual property rules”); Julia C. Morse & Robert
O. Keohane, Contested Multilateralism, 9 REV. INT’L. ORG. 385, 387–88 (2014) (coining the term “contested multilateralism” for the phenomenon and showing that it occurs across substantive areas of international law); Kal
Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources, 58 INT’L ORG. 277, 301–02
(2004) (using the experience on plant genetic resources to show “that states may also attempt to create what
we term strategic inconsistency”).
209
For more detailed descriptions of this example, see MARK A. POLLACK & GREGORY C. SHAFFER, WHEN
COOPERATION FAILS: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS (2009); Thomas
Gehring & Benjamin Faude, A Theory of Emerging Order Within Institutional Complexes: How Competition Among
Regulatory International Institutions Leads to Institutional Adaptation and Division of Labor, 9 REV. INT’L ORG. 471,
483–87 (2014).
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maintained without sufﬁcient scientiﬁc evidence.”210 In the late 1990s, some states began to
resist that requirement and to favor more of a precautionary approach. When these states
failed to alter the law within the WTO, they pursued their agenda through a different community—the one that is grounded in the Convention on Biological Diversity. There, states
established the Cartagena Protocol, which implicitly undercuts the WTO sound science
requirement by endorsing a precautionary approach and preserving some state discretion
in this area.211
The dispute about the proper scope of an importing state’s regulatory discretion has never
really been resolved. A WTO panel in the EC-Biotech case examined the European Union’s
GMO regulations but did not answer the broader question of how strictly to interpret the
sound science requirement.212 Thus, while that speciﬁc case has dissipated, either side
could easily reignite the normative conﬂict by reasserting its position in a new context.
The majority view in the literature is that such conﬂicts damage international law, to the
extent that they linger without substantive resolution.213 That view is animated by principally
two concerns. First, a normative conﬂict might undercut the efﬁcacy of international law. A
state with incompatible obligations can easily invoke one to evade the other.214 Second, the
conﬂict might destabilize or delegitimize international law.215 Because distinct communities
operate independently, conﬂicts between them tend to be resolved, if at all, through competition and the jockeying for power, not through the application of accepted legal principles.216
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Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Art. 2.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 UNTS 493; see also id. Art. 5 (requiring
risk assessment).
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Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Arts. 1, 2.4, Jan. 29, 2000,
2226 UNTS 208.
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See Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech
Products, paras. 7.75, 7.92–7.95, 8.3–8.10, WTO Docs. WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/2, WT/DS293/R (adopted
Sept. 29, 2006).
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Cohen, supra note 1, at 1050 (“The absence of obvious or agreed-upon mechanisms for resolving these
disputes has threatened to tear international law apart at the seams.”); Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino,
Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 553, 560 (2002) (“From the perspective of classical public international lawyers, conﬂicts between normative systems are, however, pathological.”); Ralf Michaels & Joost Pauwelyn, Conﬂict of Norms or Conﬂict of Laws?: Different Techniques in the
Fragmentation of Public International Law, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 349, 350 (2012) (“There exists a widespread normative preference for coherence over fragmentation. . . .”).
214
E.g., Gehring & Faude, supra note 209, at 472; Kal Raustiala, Institutional Proliferation and the International
Legal Order, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE
STATE OF THE ART (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2012).
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E.g., G. Hafner, Risks Ensuing from the Fragmentation of International Law, [2000] 2 Y.B. INT’L
L. COMM’N 143, 147, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2000/Add.1 (Part 2)/Rev.1 (asserting that such conﬂicts threaten
the “credibility, reliability and consequently, authority of international law”); Joost Pauwelyn & Luiz Eduardo
Salles, Forum Shopping Before International Tribunals: (Real) Concerns, (Im)possible Solutions, 42 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 77, 83 (2009) (asserting that “inconsistent rulings can” both “leave [a] dispute unresolved” and “threaten
the stability and legitimacy of the broader ‘system’ within which the tribunals operate”). But cf. José
E. Alvarez, Beware: Boundary Crossings, in BOUNDARIES OF STATE, BOUNDARIES OF RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS,
PRIVATE ACTORS, AND POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 92 (Tsvi Kahana & Anat Scolnicov eds., 2016) (“Some boundary
crossings are desirable, and others are not. The legitimacy of the ‘international rule of law’ does not always require
them.”).
216
A common, related refrain is that powerful countries disproportionately beneﬁt from institutional redundancy because they have the resources to exploit normative conﬂicts for their own ends. E.g., Eyal Benvenisti &
George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60
STAN. L. REV. 595, 597 (2007). Some scholars have shown that weaker countries can also beneﬁt, but these
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Those two concerns ought to be directed toward speciﬁc substantive rules. For example, we
might reasonably worry that the Cartagena Protocol undermines the efﬁcacy, stability, or
legitimacy of the WTO’s strong science requirement. But the concerns are often expressed
at a level of greater generality, as if the conﬂicts that stem from institutional redundancy cause
systemic damage to entire regulatory arrangements or to the legal order itself.217
In fact, such conﬂicts might carry systemic beneﬁts. Because distinct communities have
overlapping memberships, a conﬂict between communities often also reﬂects divisions within
a particular community. The GMO dispute was not only between the trade and biodiversity
communities but also internal to the trade community. Like other WTO conﬂicts, this one
might have strengthened that community. At the very least, it revealed the fortitude of the
opposition to the sound science requirement and provided opportunities for modest but
organic adjustment. The dispute was also a way for dissatisﬁed states to continue engaging
with and pressing for their vision of the WTO. The principal backers of the Cartagena
Protocol worked through the biodiversity community not because they had given up on
the WTO or sought to shift the overall locus of trade governance but because they were
invested in the WTO and wanted it to reﬂect their preferences. They provoked a normative
conﬂict in order to continue participating in the trade project.
Conﬂicts between international communities might also beneﬁt the legal order more generally. The sheer number of international communities means that conﬂicts persistently cut
across different alliances, rather than cleave along one dividing line. For instance, Europe
worked with many developing countries and against the United States on GMOs, but
those alliances shift in other contexts. Quite a bit of research suggests that having continuous,
crisscrossing conﬂicts helps stabilize loosely structured societies.218 When conﬂicts cut across
different associations, no single incident comes to embody all of a state’s interests or grievances. A state that is disgruntled in one community can easily tap into and try to address its
concerns in another. This reduces the state’s incentives to ﬁght to the hilt in any particular
case. Thus, even if conﬂicts between communities undermine particular substantive rules,
they might stabilize the broader legal order. Rather than persistently try to defuse or settle
these conﬂicts, we might at times let them linger or even ﬁnd ways to cultivate them.219
scholars have not contested the claim that the conﬂicts themselves undercut the legitimacy of international law.
E.g., Helfer, supra note 208, at 82.
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See, e.g., Gehring & Faude, supra note 209, at 472 (claiming that the conﬂicts “undermine institutional
commitments”); Pauwelyn & Salles, supra note 215, at 83 (claiming that the conﬂicts “threaten the stability
and legitimacy of the broader ‘system’”. . . ).
218
COSER, supra note 38, at 77 (“Stability within a loosely structured society . . . [is] partly as a product of the
continuous incidents of various conﬂicts crisscrossing it.”); GLUCKMAN, supra note 38, at 26 (“The more his ties
require that his opponents in one set of relations are his allies in another, the greater is likely to be the peace of the
feud.”); Mark C. Gordon, Differing Paradigms, Similar Flaws: Constructing A New Approach to Federalism in
Congress and the Court, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV., 187, 217–18 (1996) (“It is possible that America has managed
to maintain stability even in an era of robust individual rights precisely because the divisions that deﬁne our political structure (i.e., states) do not coincide with the divisions that deﬁne our social and cultural structure (e.g., racial
and ethnic groups and economic and national interests).”).
219
Some scholars, especially those who work in critical legal theory or global legal pluralism, have likewise
argued that we should create space for conﬂicts between communities. But these scholars either concede or do
not address the claim that I am resisting—that when these conﬂicts are protracted, they undercut a governance
association. E.g., KRISCH, supra note 62, at 234 (“Any claim that pluralism might have the potential to foster stable
cooperation faces an uphill battle: it has to cope with the widespread view that undecided supremacy claims tend to
breed instability and chaos.”); André Nollkaemper, Inside or Out: Two Types of International Legal Pluralism, in
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C. Regulatory Legitimacy
Finally, my argument offers new insights on the legitimacy of international law. Analysts
often tie international law’s legitimacy to the participants’ consent or consensus.220 That
approach suggests that protracted ethical conﬂicts pose a legitimacy problem for global governance arrangements. Such conﬂicts show that an arrangement is still contentious to the
core. But if, as I argue, ethical conﬂicts help constitute a political community, then they
might instead be an ingredient for legitimacy. Establishing a meaningful political community
might help legitimize legal arrangements in the absence of a thick substantive consensus.
Grounding international law in some kind of consensus is attractive because it has the
potential to satisfy, simultaneously, three distinct but interdependent dimensions of legitimacy.221 First, jurisprudential legitimacy, concerning the criteria for validating speciﬁc
norms as law. Second, sociological legitimacy, on whether people perceive and treat the
norms as authoritative. Third, normative legitimacy, about the circumstances in which global
actors ought to comply with speciﬁc norms. For instance, a state’s consent when it ratiﬁes a
treaty might show: (1) that decisions under the treaty are legally valid, (2) that the state accepts
the decisions as authoritative, and (3) that the state is properly bound by them. However, as
the state’s actual or felt acceptance of a decision becomes more attenuated, its consent loses
purchase along one or more of the above dimensions. As such, a claimed consensus can go
only so far to legitimize particular arrangements. It is unlikely to be sufﬁcient when an
arrangement has extensive ramiﬁcations for constituents who do not participate in it or
when it governs issues that remain divisive.
Absent a meaningful consensus, an arrangement’s legitimacy—and particularly its sociological legitimacy—might be enhanced through ethical conﬂict. As discussed, ethical conﬂict
can foster a political community, in which the participants engage together on a common
enterprise. Having that kind of community can help legitimize governance decisions in the
face of substantive disagreement. In other words, global actors might more readily accept as
NORMATIVE PLURALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 94, 134 (Jan Klabbers & Touko Piiparinen eds., 2013) (claiming
that a pluralist order lacks “the stability that is needed for deep international cooperation”); cf. KOSKENNIEMI, supra
note 57, at 608–15 (arguing for more political contestation to upend the “structural bias” in existing legal arrangements) (emphasis added). In fact, most global legal pluralists argue that, though normative conﬂicts are inevitable,
international law should still try to reconcile or overcome them, insofar as is possible. See BERMAN, supra note 62, at
10 (arguing for mechanisms that “help mediate conﬂicts by . . . seeking ways of reconciling competing norms, and
by deferring to alternative approaches, if possible”); Nico Krisch, Pluralism in International Law and Beyond, in
FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CONSTRUCTION OF A DISCIPLINE (Jean d’Aspremont &
Sahib Singh eds., forthcoming) (manuscript at 16), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2613930 (reviewing literature and concluding that “many pluralist accounts reﬂect a particular normative mission, often focused on
respect for diversity and . . . a minimization of jurisdictional conﬂicts”).
220
See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International
Environmental Law?, 93 AJIL 596, 605 (1999) (explaining that the legitimacy of international environmental law
is often assessed by reference to state consent); Jan Klabbers, Law-making and Constitutionalism, in THE
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 81, 114 (Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters & Geir Ulfstein eds.,
2009) (defending the consensual underpinnings of the sources doctrine on the ground that “anything else
would be dictatorial”); Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel & Jan Wouters, When Structures Become Shackles:
Stagnation and Dynamics in International Lawmaking, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 733, 748–49 (2014) (arguing that
the sources doctrine presents a legitimacy problem because it is satisﬁed by “thin state consent,” and that
norms that do not formally satisfy the doctrine might be more legitimate because they might be made through
more inclusive processes and “supported by a broader consensus”).
221
On these dimensions, see Nicole Roughan, Mind the Gaps: Authority and Legality in International Law, 27
EUR. J. INT’L L. 329, 340–41 (2016).
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legitimate community decisions with which they disagree if they are connected to and
invested in the community than if they are not.222 The implication is not that the arrangement should be entirely up for grabs at any given moment but that it should strike a balance
between settlement and contestability.223 Parts of it should be ﬁxed, while other parts are
pliable and open to debate.
To be sure, this path to legitimizing regulatory arrangements has certain limits. First, legal
decisions in the zones of contestation are likely to be inconsistent with one another and motivated by considerations, like raw power, that would ideally be external to law. The decisions
thus would not satisfy a prominent vision for the rule of law—one that prioritizes consistency
in application and constraints on the exercise of power.224 However, that vision for the rule of
law is not the only plausible one. As Christopher Kutz has explained, inconsistency and external inﬂuence in legal decisionmaking are not necessarily incompatible with the rule of law. A
decision that claims the mantle of law still must be defended on its own terms, with reasons
that support it. “The force of such reasons is not cancelled by the presence of competing considerations.”225 Meanwhile, the law’s pliability gives dissenters room to resist a decision and
press their opposing views. Kutz contends that this dynamic advances, rather than weakens,
the rule of law. “The ideal of the rule of law is far better served by lively debate than by wooden
consensus because debate renders the law’s many values perspicuous in the actual exercise of
authority.”226 The point for now is that any rule of law concern with ethical legal conﬂict
ought to be taken seriously but not overstated.
Second, if international law is too open-ended, it might not effectively regulate behavior.227 This just means that international law would serve a different function in its open
spaces.228 It would facilitate conﬂict. Moreover, it might to some extent still serve a regulatory
function if it establishes authoritative processes that can deﬁne codes of conduct for concrete
222

See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Respect-Worthy: Frank Michelman and the Legitimate Constitution, 39 TULSA L. REV.
485 (2004); Seyla Benhabib, Claiming Rights Across Borders: International Human Rights and Democratic
Sovereignty, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 691, 698 (2009).
223
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 88–90 (1986).
224
See, e.g., UN Secretary-General, Report on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conﬂict and PostConﬂict Societies, UN Doc. S/2004, 616, para. 6 (2004) (asserting that the rule of law “requires . . . measures to
ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness
in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of
arbitrariness, and procedural and legal transparency”); Mattias Kumm, International Law in National Courts: The
International Rule of Law and the Limits of the Internationalist Model, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 19, 25 (2003) (“Not only
does the international rule of law instill a habit of obedience, thereby civilizing the exercise of power; but the
requirement of consistency would also provide greater predictability and a more stable international
environment.”).
225
Kutz, supra note 69, at 1028.
226
Id. at 1029; see also Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law as a Theater of Debate, in DWORKIN AND HIS CRITICS
319, 330 (Justine Burley ed., 2004) (“A society ruled by law, according to Dworkin, is a society committed to a
certain method of arguing about the exercise of public power.”).
227
This claim is central to many compliance theories. E.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 124, at 10 (“[A]mbiguity and indeterminacy of treaty language” “lie at the root of much of the behavior that might seem to violate
treaty requirements.”); Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AJIL 705, 714 (1988) (“A
determinate rule is less elastic and thus less amenable to . . . evasive strategy than an indeterminate one.”); Andrew
T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823, 1863 (2002) (“As the
uncertainty of an obligation increases, the reputational cost from a violation decreases.”).
228
See BESSON, supra note 13, at 117 (“Knowing precisely where we stand is not always the point of a provision:
instead, the point may be to ensure that certain reasonable debates take place in our society rather than to settle
them entirely.”).
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settings. For example, this is what the WTO Appellate Body does now that it has unsettled
the law on the balance between trade liberalization and other public policies: it makes factspeciﬁc determinations of how the disputing states ought to behave in speciﬁc contexts.
Third, ethical conﬂict will not solve all of the legitimacy concerns that surround international law. Conﬂict’s legitimizing potential is starkest for actors who actively engage with and
see themselves as part of the relevant community. These actors might come to accept as legitimate decisions with which they disagree. But conﬂict is unlikely to have a similar impact on
actors who are marginalized within or completely outside of the community. Groups that are
disenfranchised are likely to continue questioning the legitimacy of community decisions that
affect them. As such, an arrangement’s legitimacy for its core members might be out of step
with its legitimacy for other constituencies. That kind of legitimacy gap has already been identiﬁed at the WTO229 and has led to various proposals for altering the WTO’s ethos—by
broadening the set of actors or interests that fall within its ambit.230 My argument suggests
that, rather than pursue speciﬁc substantive reforms, we might create more opportunities for
ethical engagement and contestation. We might, in other words, enhance the legal mechanisms, both at the international level and within national systems, for various constituencies
to argue about speciﬁc global governance projects.
VI. CONCLUSION
International law now touches almost every aspect of public governance, and in many areas
it penetrates deeply into national legal systems. As international law’s scope has expanded, the
world has become more integrated. The number and range of actors who engage on global
governance issues have grown, and their interactions have become more frequent. Inevitably,
these actors have also found new reasons and occasions to disagree. It is wrong to assume that
their conﬂicts detract from or impede their governance arrangements. Conﬂict is an
integral—often critical—part of these arrangements. So, we should assess and treat it as
such. Rather than persistently try to cabin, curtail, or defuse it, we should at times preserve
or even cultivate it. And we should study how best to structure it so that it further enhances
both speciﬁc regulatory arrangements and the global order more generally.
229

See Tomer Broude, The Rule(s) of Trade and the Rhetos of Development: Reﬂections on the Functional and
Aspirational Legitimacy of the WTO, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 221 (2006); Weiler, supra note 178.
230
See, e.g., Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Toward a Global Ethics of Trade Governance: Subsidiarity Writ
Large, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., 259, 266–67 (2016); Stewart & Badin, supra note 151, at 579.
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